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INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE INACTION
William N. Eskridge, Jr. *

There is a longstanding debate in the theory of statutory interpretation over what meaning, if any, can be attributed to the legislature's
failure to do something. Issues of "legislative inaction" often arise in
cases where the Supreme Court considers the validity of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and the argument is made
that the interpretation must be accepted because Congress has acquiesced in it by not overruling it, has ratified it by reenacting the statute,
or at some point was presented with a formal bill or amendment embodying an alternative interpretation and rejected it. 1 The Court has
grappled with such arguments since the nineteenth century, 2 oftentimes finding inaction arguments persuasive but other times finding
them unappealing. The debate within the Court over the significance
of legislative inaction has intensified in the last two Terms, 3 in large
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. - Ed. ·
Many thanks to Alexander Aleinikoff, Robert Drinan, Daniel Farber, Philip Frickey,
Michael Froomldn, Lawrence Marshall, Dennis Patterson, and Richard Posner for generous and
constructive comments on an earlier .draft of this article. Dean Robert Pitofsky of the
Georgetown University Law Center provided intellectual encouragement and financial support
for my work on this article, for which I am grateful. I appreciate the research assistance provided by Christopher Williams, Kathleen Blanchard, and Robert Schoshinski.
1. As the quotation marks suggest, "legislative inaction" is a term of art widely used in
Supreme Court opinions and law review articles for the phenomena described in the text. But,
obviously, for each phenomenon - acquiescence, reenactment, rejection - Congress (or a subgroup in Congress) is engaged in "action" as well. And the phenomena discussed in this article
do not exhaust the occasions for which Congress' failure to act has doctrinal significance.
2. See, e.g.. United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 161-62 (1841) (Story, J.).
3. The main legislative inaction decisions handed down in the 1987 Term were Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2654-55 (1988) (rejecting argument based upon
rejected proposals; but see 108 S. Ct. at 2663-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)); Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (1988) (accepting reenactment argument;
but see 108 S. Ct. at 2555 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment));
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (rejecting argument based on rejected
proposals; but see 108 S. Ct. at 2519-20 & n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting)); Monessen S.W. Ry. v.
Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1843-44 (1988) (accepting acquiescence and rejected proposal arguments; but see 108 S. Ct. at 1848-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part));
Landers v. National R.R. Passengers Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1440, 1442 (1988) (accepting rejected
proposal argument); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1153-54 (1988) (rejecting argument based upon rejected proposals); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 S.
Ct. 971, 977 n.7 (1988) (rejecting acquiescence argument); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
108 S. Ct. 963, 968 (1988) (accepting rejected proposal argument); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 950, 958-59 (1988) (accepting rejected proposal argument).
The main legislative inaction decisions handed down in the 1986 Term were Tanner v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2748-50 (1987) (accepting rejected proposal argument; but see 101 S. Ct.
at 2757-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987) (rejecting acquiescence argument; but see
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part because of the appointment of Justice Antonin Scalia, who has
articulated sophisticated arguments against giving positive meaning to
legislative inaction.
These arguments may be tested early in the 1988 Term. The Court
has requested briefs in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 4 to address
the question whether the Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary 5
should be overruled. Runyon interpreted section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 (now section 1981)6 to prohibit private discrimination in
contractual relations. In Patterson, four Justices sharply dissented
from the request for further briefs on what they considered a settled
question. The dissenting Justices relied, in part, upon Congress' failure to overturn the Court's line of decisions interpreting the 1866 Act
to cover private discrimination. 7 The briefs for petitioner and several
supporting amici strongly rely on several legislative inaction arguments. 8 Patterson, therefore, presents the Court with a clear opportunity to make sense of its legislative inaction precedents, perhaps with
an eye on Justice Scalia's critique.
Patterson also provides commentators with an opportunity to revisit the Court's theory and practice in legislative inaction cases. Traditionally, scholars have been skeptical of the Court's inconsistent use
of legislative inaction and have argued that "almost no reliable inference of [legislative] intent could be drawn" from the legislature's silence or inaction. 9 However, there has also been some scholarly
107 S. Ct. at 2348 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); United States v.
Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 & n.6 (1987) (accepting acquiescence argument; but see 107 S. Ct.
at 2075 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S.
Ct. 1442, 1450-51 n.7 (1987) (accepting acquiescence argument; but see 107 S. Ct. at 1472-73
(Scalia, J., dissenting)); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1218-19 (1987) (accepting
rejected proposal argument; but see 107 S. Ct. at 1230 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
4. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam).
5. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." Part of the debate
within the Court in Runyon was whether§ 1981 was taken from the 1866 Act. I am assuming in
this article that it was, as the Court held, but I have undertaken no independent investigation of
this matter.
7. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 174 &
n.11).
'
8. The main briefs making legislative inaction arguments are Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 71-100, Patterson (No. 87-107) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]; Brief of 66 Members of
the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States House of Representatives as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20-28 [hereinafter Congress' Brief]; Brief on Reargument for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 11-16 (hereinafter Lawyers' Committee Brief].
9. R. DICKERSON, THE l_NTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181 (1975); see
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defense of a limited use of legislative inaction as an interpretive tool. 10
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the doctrinal and
theoretical debate about the meaning of legislative inaction for the
statutory interpreter. I hope to make three contributions. Part I offers
a doctrinal starting point for analyzing legislative inaction issues generally and those in Patterson in particular. Three related doctrines
emerge from the Court's past treatment of legislative inaction issues:
(1) the "acquiescence rule," positing that if Congress does not overturn a judicial or administrative interpretation it probably acquiesces
in it; (2) the "reenactment rule," which posits that a reenactment of
the statute incorporates any settled interpretations of the statute by
courts or agencies; and (3) the "rejected proposal rule," which posits
that proposals rejected by Congress are an indication that the statute
cannot be interpreted to resemble the rejected propo~als. These rules
are not inevitably followed, though. In some cases, the Court finds
great meaning in "positive inaction." 11 In other cases the Court finds
such an inquiry nothing more than "the pursuit of a mirage." 12 Still,
the reasoning of the cases seeks, with some success, to suggest coherence. Generally, when the Court finds meaning in Congress' inaction,
it points to specific legislative consideration of the issue and, either
implicitly ·or explicitly, indicates that Congress' failure to act bespeaks
a probable intent to reject the alternative(s).
Thus, I think there is a little more coherence to the Court's approach to legislative inaction than most commentators have found.
The Court's reasoning is an intelligent, practical effort to fit the legislature's inaction into what the Court perceives as its general mandate to
respect legislative intent when it interprets statutes. The question remains, however, whether legislative inaction really does tell the Court,
or us, anything about legislative intent in these cases. The answer depends very much on what one means by "legislative intent." Part II
argues that if one means the actual collective will or desire of the enH. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1394-1401 (tentative ed. 1958); Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into
Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1133 (1983); Eskridge, Overruling Statutory
Precedents, 16 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1402-09 (1988); Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L.
REV. 207, 214-15 (1917); Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A
Venture into ''Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984); Note, Congressional Silence
& the Supreme Court, 27 IND. L.J. 288 (1952).
10. See 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 49.10 (4th ed. 1984);
Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 51 IND. L.J. 515 (1982); Froomkin, The Sound of One House Clapping: Theories
of Congressional Acquiescence (July 1988 draft)(forthcoming); see also Horack, Congressional
Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 247 (1947).
11. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
12. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942).
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acting legislature, legislative inaction should rarely be given much, or
any, weight. Assuming this view of legislative intent, I agree with and
elaborate upon Justice Scalia's critique of the Court's frequent invocation of legislative inaction.
Part III argues that the cases make more sense if we read them as
decisions about presumed, rather than actual, legislative intent. Like
other legal doctrines drawing inferences from inaction, the various legislative inaction doctrines are policy presumptions having this general
message: When Congress enacts a statute that implicitly or explicitly
delegates lawmaking authority to courts, agencies, or the executive,
"building block interpretations" by the courts, agencies, or executive
are presumptively correct if Congress does not disturb them. A building block interpretation of the statute is one that is authoritative or
settled and has given rise to public or private reliance interests.
Hence, there is no presumption of correctness for interpretations that
are not authoritative (e.g., a single lower court decision), or have not
been treated as reliable building blocks for private conduct or public
policy. The presumption of correctness can be rebutted by clear evidence that the building block interpretation is inconsistent with the
statutory language and policies.
At first blush, the proposition staked out in Part III seems like an
unusual approach to statutory interpretation, but I argue that its presumption is quite consistent with other widely accepted practices and
doctrines in statutory interpretation, especially clear statement rules.
More importantly, a presumption or clear statement approach has the
substantial virtue of explaining the Court's own legislative inaction
precedents better than the "actual intent" or "collective will" proposition does. While I think my explanation of the legislative inaction
cases describes what the Court is doing pretty well, I have several normative problems with the cases. My general problem is that the cases
overemphasize what I call "vertical continuity," that is, the perseverance of an interpretation over time. And the cases underemphasize
"horizontal continuity," that is, the coherence of rules and policies at
any given time. As the Court applies the lessons of the legislative inaction cases, it ought to be mindful of the need for law to evolve. Patterson is a classic case for application of the presumed intent of the case
law and is not subject to this normative problem.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S LEGISLATIVE INACTION CASES AND
THEIR LEGAL PROCESS REASONING

The legislative inaction cases decided by the Supreme Court in the
post-World War II era can be generally divided into three categories:

October 1988]

Interpreting Legislative Inaction

71

the "acquiescence cases," in which the Court concludes that Congress'
failure to overturn a judicial or administrative interpretation is evidence that Congress has acquiesced in that interpretation of the statute; the "reenactment cases," where the acquiescence argument is
buttressed by reenactment of the interpreted statute without material
change; and the "rejected proposal cases," in which the Court infers
from the rejection of a bill or amendment by Congress, or by a chamber or committee of Congress, that an interpretation similar to the
rejected proposal is excluded from the statute. There are also many
cases where the Court has refused to draw these inferences from Congress' failure to respond, its reenactment of a statute, or its rejection of
a proposal. Three appendices to this article list post-1961 Supreme
Court decisions accepting or refusing to accept these arguments.
Overall, the cases suggest that the Court does not lightly rely upon
inaction as the primary basis for its decisions in statutory interpretation cases and that the Court will usually justify reliance on legislative
inaction by pointing to Congress' awareness of the futerpretative issue,
and some deliberation about it. In contrast, when the Court refuses to
credit significance to legislative inaction, it will usually point to Congress' inattention to the issue. In this part, I shall survey each line of
cases and explain how they fit together by using the legal process rationales generally suggested by the Court. The discussion of each rule
(acquiescence, reenactment, rejected proposal) will conclude with its
application in Patterson, for all three types of inaction arguments can
reasonably be made in that case.
A.

The Acquiescence Rule

The leading acquiescence case is Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 13
which held that labor unions are not wholly excluded from coverage of
the Sherman Act. Judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws had
originally extended those laws to cover union activity in a broad range
of cases. Although legislative amendments to the statutes narrowed
that range, Apex Hosiery held not only that Congress had not overruled the early cases, but that Congress had fortified them. "The long
time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially
construed . . . is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial
construction is the correct one," the Court concluded. "This is the
more so where, as here, the application of the statute to labor unions
has brought forth sharply conflicting views both on the Court and in
Congress, and where after the matter has been fully brought to the
13. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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attention of the public and the Congress, the latter has not seen fit to
change the statute." 14 The Apex Hosiery principle shows up in many
Supreme Court decisions interpreting statutes, though the Court typically exercises caution when invoking its acquiescence rule.
A recent application of the acquiescence rule is Flood v. Kuhn, 15
which also involved interpretation of the Sherman Act. In Federal
Baseball Club v. National League, 16 the Court held that baseball in the
1920s was not subject to the Sherman Act because its "exhibitions"
were "purely state affairs" and not directly involved in interstate commerce, as required by the Act. 17 In the ensuing decades, of course,
baseball grew into a highly popular interstate business. Yet the Court
in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. 18 refused to overrule Federal
Baseball, in part because "Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by
legislation having prospective effect." 19 In the 1950s and 1960s, after
Toolson, baseball continued its interstate growth, adding lucrative television contracts to its other interstate dimensions. This made Federal
Baseball an increasingly anomalous opinion - especially after the
Court applied the Sherman Act to other professional sports. 20 The
Court in Flood again reconsidered Federal Baseball and, again, refused
to overrule it, primarily relying on the "positive inaction" of Congress. 21 In particular, the Court noted that between 1957 and 1965
more than fifty bills were introduced to deal with the issue; that even
after extensive consideration and hearings (two of the bills passed one
house of Congress), none of the bills became law; and that most of the
bills would have expanded rather than contracted antitrust immunity. 22 Based upon this evidence, the Court concluded that "Congress
as yet has had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the
reach of the antitrust statutes."2 3
The precept that Congress by its positive inaction can incorporate
a judicial interpretation into statutory law is sometimes cited by the
14. 310 U.S. at 488-89.
15. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
16. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
17. 259 U.S. at 208.
18. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
19. 346 U.S. at 357.
20. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
21. 407 U.S. at 283.
22. 407 U.S. at 281-82.
23. 407 U.S. at 283; see 401 U.S. at 283-84 ("Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed
those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.").
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Court when it refuses to overrule its own statutory precedents. 24 And
sometimes the Court will incorporate settled lower court statutory interpretations into the statute, based upon Congress' failure to overrule
them after they have been brought to Congress' attention. 25 The Apex
Hosiery rule is also applicable to agency and executive interpretations
of statutes, and there are a substantial number of cases relying on congressional acquiescence in nonjudicial interpretations.
Bob Jones University v. United States 26 is a significant acquiescence
case for executive department interpretations. The Court held that the
income tax exemption for "[c]orporations ... organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes"27
does not apply to educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of race. The primary ground for the Court's holding was that permitting a tax exemption for educational institutions discriminating on
the basis of race would be fundamentally at odds with our national
policy against racial discrimination and the statute's overall purpose. 28
In support of its decision, the Court emphasized legislative acquiescence in this interpretation of the statute, first voiced by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in 1970. The Court observed: "Nonaction by
Congress is not often a useful guide, but the nonaction here is
significant. " 29
To begin with, the IRS position became the focus of prolonged
public debate and congressional hearings (the first of which was held
only a month after the IRS announced the interpretation in 1970). At
least thirteen bills were introduced in Congress to overturn the IRS
interpretation, yet none even emerged from committee, even though
other amendments to the charitable exemption provision were passed
in 1976. "It is hardly conceivable that Congress ... was not abundantly aware of what was going on. In view of its prolonged and acute
awareness of so important an issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills
24. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 & n.6 (1987); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1450 n.7 (1987); Square D Co. v. Njagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 420, 423-24 (1986); Southern Motor Carriers ·Rate
Conf. Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55 n.18 (1985).
25. See Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1843-44 (1988); Lindahl v. Office of
Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782-88 (1985); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
378-82 (1982); Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200-01
(1974); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-13 (1962).
26. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). ·
28. 461 U.S. at 585-96.
29. 461 U.S. at 600; see 461 U.S. at 600 ("Ordinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are
slow to attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular legislation.").
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proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that
Congress acquiesced in the IRS rulings." 30 Most importantly, the
Court emphasized that "Congress affirmatively manifested its acquiescence" by enacting a new provision that denies tax-exempt status to
social clubs discriminating on the basis of race. 31 The new provision
filled a gap in the IRS anti-discrimination policy, created when a
three-judge court held that discriminatory social clubs could still receive tax exemptions. And the committee reports for the amendment
strongly endorsed the IRS policy against racial discrimination, stating
that "discrimination on account of race is inconsistent with an educational institution's tax exempt status."32 The Court believed this language all but endorsed the IRS rule set forth in 1970. 33
As in Bob Jones, the Court will often find that congressional failure
to disapprove of executive department regulations, while "not dispositive . . . strongly implies that the regulations accurately reflect congressional intent."34 The inference is even stronger in the foreign
affairs arena, where the executive has special competence; the Court
will routinely infer legislative approval of executive practices, where
"Congress has consistently failed to object to [such interpretations or
practices] ... even when it has had an opportunity to do so." 35 The
Court draws similar inferences from interpretations by independent
agencies. It will attribute significance to legislative inaction "once an
agency's statutory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress,' and the latter has not sought to
alter that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other
respects. " 36
30. 461 U.S. at 600-01.
31. 461 U.S. at 601 (citing Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 50l(i) (1982))).
32. s. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNO. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6051, 6058 & n.5.
33. 461 U.S. at 601-02; see also 461 U.S. at 607 & n.2 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
34. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 568 (1984); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S.
Ct. 1123, 1126-27 (1987) (HHS); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 107
S. Ct. 766, 774 (1987) (HUD); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982)
(HEW); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 73-74 (1974) (INS). Bob Jones is an example of the special
deference given to IRS interpretations of the Code that are not overturned by Congress. See also
Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 225 (1984) (reenactment case); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1981); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569,
576-77 (1977) (reenactment case).
35. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 n.10 (1981) (a leading case); see also Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965).
36. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) (quoting Apex Hosiery, 310
U.S. at 489) (a leading case); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 137 (1986) (Corps of Engineers); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1981); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 564-66 (1982) (Civil
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While the Apex Hosiery acquiescence rule has been very widely invoked by the Court, there are almost as many decisions expressly refusing to follow the rule. The leading case is Helvering v. Hallock, 37
which overruled several Supreme Court precedents interpreting an estate tax provision of the Internal Revenue Code. The acquiescence
argument in the case was a strong one: Not only had Congress failed
to change the provision to overrule those precedents, but it had
amended related estate tax provisions, including other subsections of
the same Code section, to respond to other Supreme Court precedents. 38 Nonetheless, the Court overruled the precedent. "It would
require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines. To
explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself
sheds no light is to venture_ into speculative unrealities."39
When the Court follows Hallock, it generally pays lip service to the
acquiescence rule and emphasizes procedural reasons why legislative
inaction is not particularly cogent. One strategy is to show that Congress was not aware of the judicial or administrative interpretation
and, therefore, could not be charged with any form of approval by its
failure to overturn it. For example, in Zuber v. Allen, 40 the Court
rejected the Department of Agriculture's apparent interpretation of
the Agricultural Milk Marketing Act of 1937, to exempt "nearby
farmers" from the uniform pricing contemplated by the Act. The
Court had some nasty things to say about the inaction argument but
confined them to a footnote. 41 Its main reason for rejecting the argument was the ambiguity of the Department's position and the clear
evidence that, whatever the Department's position was, Congress had
never been made aware of it nor been given a meaningful chance to
express disapproval. 42 There are numerous cases where the Court follows this first, highly popular, strategy of explaining away legislative
inaction by reference to Congress' ignorance of the prior interpretaService Commission); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 383-85 (1981); EEOC v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981); Board of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. v. First
Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 245-48 (1978); Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 40910 (1975); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
37. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
38. See 309 U.S. at 130-32 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
39. 309 U.S. at 119-20 (majority opinion).
40. 396 U.S. 168 (1969).
41. 396 U.S. at 185 n.21.
42. See 396 U.S. at 192-94.
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tion43 or to the lack of a clear line of interpretation by an agency or the
courts.44
A second strategy around the acquiescence rule has been to posit
that Congress, even though it has not formally overruled the administrative or judicial interpretation, has acted as though the interpretation were not the settled one. An important case is Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 45 which overruled the Court's earlier
decision immunizing local governments from lawsuits pursuant to section 1983.46 Congress had considered several bills to overrule the precedent, but the Court rejected any acquiescence argument, in part
because it would be "inconsistent with recent expressions of congressional intent."47 That is, when Congress passed laws authorizing
grants to school boards and other local governmental bodies to assist
in compliance with federal court decrees, it tacitly recognized that
school boards and other local bodies were often defendants in section
1983 actions. 48 And the Senate report to the Civil Rights Attorneys
Fees Awards Act of 1976 (the Fees Act)49 explicitly recognized that
"defendants in [section 1983] cases are often State or local bodies" and
that those defendants ought in appropriate cases to pay counsel fees
for prevailing plaintiffs. 50
A third strategy for avoiding the acquiescence rule is to contend
that subsequent legislative inactivity cannot ratify a clearly erroneous
prior interpretation. A significant recent case illustrating this exception is Aaron v. SEC. 51 The issue was whether the SEC had to establish scienter as a necessary element in an injunction action to enforce
the anti-fraud rule. The Court held that scienter was necessary, based
upon the reasoning of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 52 which had held
that a private party seeking damages under the anti-fraud rule had to
prove scienter. This seems logical enough, but the SEC had a particu43. See, e.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 260, 262 n.15 (1981); Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212-30 (1974); Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 120 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987);
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 2154 (1987); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 258-62 (1981); Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 614-15 (1981).
45. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
46. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
47. 436 U.S. at 696.
48. See 436 U.S. at 696-97 & n.63.
49. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)).
50. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5913; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 697-99.
51. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
52. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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lady strong legislative inaction argument. Namely, both before and
after Hochfelder, the SEC and lower federal courts had interpreted the
statute not to require scienter for injunction actions, and the agency
and the courts developed logical policy reasons for such a distinction. 53 In 1975, Congress revised the securities laws and added a provision preventing consolidation of public and private anti-fraud
actions, apparently because of the potentially different scienter requirements. Hearings in 1977 focused on the scienter issue and expressed general legislative approval of the position taken by the SEC
and the lower courts. 54 The Court's only response to these arguments,
contained in a footnote, was that "since the legislative consideration of
those statutes was addressed principally to matters other than that at
issue here, it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the
Commission's interpretation falls far short of providing a basis to support a construction of § lO(b) so clearly at odds with its plain meaning
and legislative history."ss
To apply the precepts of these acquiescence cases to Patterson, consider the following chronology. In 1968, the Supreme Court held in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 56 that section 1982's57 prohibition of discrimination in the sale or rental of property applies to private as well
as public conduct. Since section 1982 is also (apparently) taken from
section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, lower courts between 1968 and
1972 all but unanimously interpreted section 1981 to apply to discrimination in private contract matters. 58 Congress was well aware of this
stream of lower court decisions, for when it was considering the 1972
amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it rejected efforts to
make Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. 59
Then, in three decisions between 1972 and 1976, the Supreme Court
explicitly held that section 1981 applies to private contracts. 60 Soon
after the Court's decision in Runyon, Congress enacted the Fees Act of
53. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 715-16 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. See 446 U.S. at 717 n.9.
SS. 446 U.S. at 694 n.11 (majority opinion).
56. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
57. 42 u.s.c. § 1982 (1982).
58. See c. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 265-76 (1980); Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 8, app. B (collecting the lower court cases). The only reported exception was
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd. on other grounds, 458 F.2d
1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
59. See Part l.C infra.
60. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-75 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U.S.
431, 439-40 (1973).
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1976, 61 which assumed the correctness of Runyon's interpretation and
sought to encourage section 1981 and 1982 lawsuits by providing
counsel fees to prevailing parties. 62 Since 1976, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held or assumed that sections 1981 and 1982 apply to
private discrimination. 63 Congress has done nothing to alter or overturn that interpretation, even though it has overturned other Supreme
Court interpretations of civil rights statutes in the last ten .Years. 64
This chronology seems to make Patterson very much likeApex Hosiery: "[T]he matter has been fully brought to the attention of the
public and the Congress," and "the latter has not seen fit to change the
statute." 65 And like Flood: By its "positive inaction" 66 in rejecting
the proposals to limit section 1981, Congress has accepted the judicial
interpretation of the statute. And like Bob Jones: "Congress affirmatively manifested its acquiescence,"67 not only by rejecting proposals
to overturn the interpretation, but by building on the interpretation in
the Fees Act. For substantially the same reasons, Patterson does not
seem to fall under any of the three exceptions to the acquiescence
rule. 68

B. The Reenactment Cases
In many of the acquiescence cases, including Apex Hosiery, the
Court has emphasized that Congress' inaction was meaningful because
Congress had focused on the statute and actually amended it. Even
though the amendments did not add or detract from the prior interpretation at issue, Congress' failure to respond to that interpretation
61. Runyon was decided on June 25, 1976. The Senate and House Judiciary Committees
issued their reports in the summer, both mentioning the Supreme Court cases holding § 1981
applicable to private contracts. The Senate passed the bill on September 29, and the House on
October I.
62. See Part l.B infra.
63. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2026-28 (1987) (person of
Arabian descent may sue under§ 1981, relying on Runyon and legislative debates for 1866 Civil
Rights Act); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019, 2021 (1987) (Jews are a group
protected by§ 1982, reaffirming Alfred H. Mayer); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976) (Caucasians may sue under § 1981).
64. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)(overturning General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976)).
65. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 489.
66. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
67. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 574.
68. The most pertinent exception would be the Aaron exception for clearly erroneous interpretations. Professor Farber makes a good case for Runyon's interpretation in Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 3, 6-7 (1988). See also note 173
infra.
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when it was considering the precise statute "is itself evidence that
Congress affirmatively intended to preserve [the interpretation]." 69
This form of the acquiescence argument is closely related to the reenactment rule, which the Court generally treats as a separate doctrine.
There have been a number of cases throughout the century in which
the Court has held that "the reenactment by Congress, without
change, of a statute which had previously received long continued executive [or judicial] construction, is an adoption by Congress of such
construction." 70 The leading recent articulation of the rule is the
Court's statement in Lorillard v. Pons: 71 "Congress is presumed to be
aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when · it re-enacts a statute without
change. " 72
Although the Lorillard principle shows up in many Supreme Court
opinions and seems more procedurally attractive than the bar~ acquiescence rule, it too is rather cautiously invoked by the Court. The rule
is rarely the primary basis for the Court's decision, and when it is the
primary basis, the Court often seeks to reassure itself that Congress
actually was (or must have been) aware of the existing interpretations
when it reenacted the provision in question. An illustrative case is
United States v. Board of Commissioners ofSheffield, Alabama. 73 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides for Department of
Justice preclearance of specified electoral changes for "a State or political subdivision" covered by section 4 of the Act. In Sheffield, the
Court held that municipalities within covered states are subject to
69. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982); see
Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgt., 470 U.S. 768, 782-83 & n.15 (1985); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982).
70. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compaiiia, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908). See also
United States v. G. Falk & Brother, 204 U.S. 143, 152 (1907). The Court applied this reenactment rule to judicial decisions in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 0923); National Lead Co.
v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1920).
71. 434 u.s 575 (1978).
72. 434 U.S. at 580 (citations omitted). The issue in Lorillard was whether Congress meant
to "borrow" accepted judicial interpretations of one statute when it borrowed language from that
statute. See also Director, OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1983). The
Court considers Lorillard equally applicable to situations where the reenactment of the same
statute adopts prior interpretations of that statute. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(1988). For older examples, see United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924); Latimer v. United States, 223 U.S. 501 (1912). Older leading cases for
the reenactment rule are Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100-01 (1939); Helvering v.
Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1934); Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 500 (1933); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1931); Heald v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 20, 22-23 (1920); United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compaiiia, 209 U.S. 337
(1908).
73. 435 U.S. 110 (1978).

80

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:67

preclearance review. The Court's main argument was that the Attorney General, charged with enforcing the statute, had long interpreted
preclearance to apply to municipalities and school districts and that
Congress had reenacted the Act in 1970 and 1975, without changing
section 5 to overrule that interpretation. "When a Congress that reenacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation, and this Court is bound thereby." 74 The Court was sensitive to
the argument that "it is impermissible to draw inferences of approval
from the unexplained inaction of Congress," 75 but responded that
Congress was fully aware of the Attorney General's interpretation and
approved of it. For example, in 1975 an Assistant Attorney General
testified explicitly about his Department's policy in House and Senate
hearings, and several other witnesses directly or indirectly assumed
that the Department's policy was settled. 76 Not only was this view
reflected in comments even of opponents to the 1975 extension, but
also the House and Senate committee reports explicitly contemplated
that the preclearance requirement would apply to municipalities and
school districts. 77
As it did in Sheffield, the Court may elevate executive department
interpretations of statutes into settled meaning if Congress has not
only reenacted the statute, but also was aware of the executive interpretation and seemed not unhappy with the interpretation. 78 The
same principle applies to interpretations by independent agencies.
"When the statute giving rise to the longstanding interpretation has
been re-enacted without pertinent change, the 'congressional failure to
revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that
the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.' " 79 And, as in
Lorillard itself, the Court will find that Congress' reenactment of a
statute will incorporate settled judicial interpretations of the statute. 80
74. 435 U.S. at 134.
75. 435 U.S. at 135.
76. 435 U.S. at 133.
77. 435 U.S. at 134.
78. Recent cases elevating executive department interpretations include Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766, 774 (1987); City of Pleasant Grove v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 794, 798 (1987); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1984); Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297-301 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 148-49 (1979);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457 (1978); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1977); FERC v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 567-71 (1976).
79. FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986) (quoting NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (leading case)); see also Commodity Futures Trading
Commn. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975).
80. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51 (1988); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. Env. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
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While the Court in these cases often invokes the reenactment rule
without a specific showing that Congress was aware of the judicial
interpretations, the Court usually makes an effort to demonstrate that
Congress "must" have been aware of the interpretations.
In Snyder v. Harris, 81 the issue was whether separate claims
presented by various claimants in a class action could be aggregated to
provide the $10,000 amount in controversy required under the diversity jurisdiction statute. 82 A long line of Supreme Court decisions had
interpreted the statute not to allow aggregation, but the class argued
that the approach taken by these decisions was impractical and unnecessarily grudging, especially in light of new developments in class actions. The Court rejected this argument, based upon a cautious
invocation of the reenactment rule. "There are no doubt hazards and
pitfalls involved in assuming that re-enactment of certain language by
Congress always freezes the existing judicial interpretation of statutes
involved," but the Court was persuaded that the reenactment rule was
applicable, because it believed the "settled judicial interpretation of
'amount in controversy' was implicitly taken into account" by Congress. 83 Congress had deliberated about the amount in controversy
and raised the amount three times in the last century, 84 each time reenacting the diversity statute otherwise intact. Surely, the Court supposed, Congress must have given thought to the established
nonaggregation rule. 8s
Like the acquiescence rule, the reenactment rule is not always followed, and the three strategies for avoiding the acquiescence rule are
also used to avoid the reenactment rule. The leading case is Girouard
v. United States. 86 Girouard held that the Nationality Act of 1940 did
not require an alien to take an oath to bear arms for this country in
order to obtairi citizenship. A dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Harlan Stone, the author of Apex Hosiery, relied on prior Supreme
(1986); Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74, 85 (1980); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 n.16 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 278-79
(1977); United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279-81 (1975); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972).
81. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
82. 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1982).
83. 394 U.S. at 339.
84. The Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, raised the amount from $500 to $2000. The Act
of March 3, 1911, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091, raised the amount to $3000. The Act of July 25, 1958, 72,
Stat. 415, raised the amount to $10,000.
85. 394 U.S. at 339-40.
86. 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Girouard relied upon Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
Although the Court treated the case mainly as an acquiescence case, Hallock is, technically, also
a reenactment case. See Hallock, 309 U.S. at 120 n.7.
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Court interpretations of the statutory oath requirement. Although the
Chief Justice had not joined the earlier precedents, he felt bound by
them, since Congress had "adopted" them; not only had Congress
failed to amend the Nationality Act in response to public efforts to
overrule the decisions, it had, instead, reenacted the provision without
change in 1940. 87 The Court rejected the reenactment argument, using language identical to that of Hallock. " 'It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this
Court from reexamining its own doctrines,'" the Court reasoned. "It
is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." 88 More persuasive for the Court
than Congress' inaction in 1940 was Congress' action in 1942, when
Congress specifically amended the Nationality Act to permit noncombatants to become citizens. The Court concluded that "the affirmative
action taken by Congress in 1942 negatives any inference that otherwise might be drawn from its silence when it reenacted the [statute] in
1940." 89
Girouard represents one strategy for avoiding the reenactment
rule; as in Monell, Congress acted as though the prior judicial interpretation was not settled law. Two other strategies for avoiding the
reenactment rule are illustrated by the Court's decision in Leary v.
United States. 90 The Court invalidated the transfer tax provision of
the Marihuana Tax Act91 on the ground that they required defendant,
Dr. Timothy Leary, to supply the government with self-incriminating
information. The government sought to sidestep this constitutional
difficulty by claiming that the registration requirements of the statute
were only applicable to persons engaged in legal use of marihuana; it
relied upon administrative regulations to this effect, and implicit legislative approval of those regulations when Congress reenacted the statute in 1954. The Court rejected this use of the reenactment rule,
primarily because the Court found it patently unsupported by the statutory language and the legislative history. Although "congressional
re-enactment of a statute, even without any apparent knowledge of a
particular regulation, can 'strengthen to some extent' the regulation's
claim to validity . . . re-enactment cannot save a regulation which
'contradict[s] the requirements' of the statute itself." 92 This represents
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
United

328 U.S. at 73-76 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
328 U.S. at 69 (quoting Hallock, 309 U.S. at 119).
328 U.S. at 70.
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-4746 (repealed 1970).
395 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc. v.
States, 377 U.S. 235, 241, 242 (1964)).
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a second strategy around the reenactment rule: Where the prior interpretation is flatly inconsistent with relatively clear statutory language
or history, the Court may abandon the Lorillard presumption that
C~mgress was aware of and adopted the prior line of interpretation.
Leary also rejected the reenactment rule because the Court was
doubtful that the government's interpretation was in fact the "longstanding interpretation" of the Act by the agencies charged with enforcing it.93 This represents the third strategy for getting around the
reenactment rule: Congress cannot be presumed to "know" an administrative interpretation that is unsettled even in the minds of the administrators. Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co. 94 illustrates this
exception in connection with prior judicial interpretations. A unanimous Court held that Congress' thorough overhaul of the Longshoremen and Harborworkers Compensation Act in 1972 did not implicitly
codify a decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
which permitted longshoremen to sue third parties, and not just their
immediate employers, once it became clear the employers would not
sue the third parties. 95 The Court found that the earlier interpretation
was inconsistent with both the language and purpose of the 1972 statute and that the single lower court decision was not the "well-established" interpretation that Congress should be presumed to know. 96
Probably for this reason, the Court often will not incorporate lower
court decisions into a statute through the reenactment rule. 97
Under these reenactment cases, the Fees Act of 1976 significantly
buttresses the acquiescence argument in Patterson. The statute itself
provides counsel fees for prevailing plaintiffs in cases brought under
sections 1981, 1982, and 1983 of title 42. 98 Section 1983 provides a
remedy for persons discriminated against by state actors, and sections
1981 and 1982 - as interpreted in Runyon and Alfred H. Mayer provide a substantially parallel remedy for persons discriminated
93. 395 U.S. at 25.
94. 451 U.S. 596 (1981).
95. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
96. 451 U.S. at 614-16. Cf Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256
(1979) (ruling that the codification of a judicially created rule should be interpreted consistently
with that rule).
97. For decisions refusing to apply the reenactment rule to a series of lower court decisions,
see Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 346-48 (1984); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 692-94 (1980); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55
n.13 (1964).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982): "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
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against by private actors. Overruling Runyon would render section
1981 largely repetitious of section 1983,99 a result at odds with the text
of section 1988. Indeed, the Senate report suggested that the main
reason sections 1981 and 1982 were included was to assure that plaintiffs pursuing lawsuits against private discrimination would have counsel fee incentives similar to those of plaintiffs suing under Titles VII
and VIII of modern civil rights laws. 100 The House report and floor
statements by Representative Drinan (the House manager of the bill)
and Senator Tunney (the Senate manager) also expressed congressional understanding and approval of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1981.101
This brief history of the Fees Act suggests that the reenactment
cases support the legislative inaction argument in Patterson. The
Lorillard precept that "Congress is presumed to be aware of [a] judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
re-enacts a statute without change" 102 seems applicable, even though
the Fees Act only referred to section 1981 and did not reenact it. As
in Sheffield, committee reports and floor debate amplify the inference
that Congress understood the implications of Runyon and incorporated its holding in section 1988. As in Snyder, a "settled judicial in
terpretation ... was ... taken into account" by Congress when it
passed the law. 103
C.

The Rejected Proposal Cases

In many of its acquiescence and reenactment cases, the Court fortifies its argument that legislative inaction has ratified the existing interpretation by pointing to the rejection of the opposite interpretation by
99. Such a ruling would not render the section entirely redundant. For example,§ 1981 has
been interpreted to cover federal contractual matters, e.g., Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155
(9th Cir. 1974), that are not covered by Title VII.
100. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD·
MIN. NEWS 5908, 5911: "[F]ees are now authorized in an employment discrimination suit under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not in the same suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which protects similar rights but involves fewer technical prerequisites to the filing of an action.
Fees are allowed in a housing discrimination suit brought under Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, but not in the same suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a Reconstruction Act
protecting the same rights."
101. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 & n.8 (1976) (citing with approval two
Supreme Court cases holding § 1981 applicable to private discrimination and noting with ap·
proval a House committee's view that § 1981 and Title VII remedies are "co-extensive"); 122
CONG. REc. 35122 (1976) (Rep. Drinan) (§§ 1981 & 1982 "generally prohibit the denial of civil
and constitutional rights in a variety of areas"; Fees Act not meant to disturb this); 121 CONG.
REc. S 14975 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975) (Sen. Tunney)(§ 1981 protects "similar rights" as Title
VII and ought to have similar counsel fee provision).
102. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580.
103. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 339.
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either the enacting Congress or a subsequent one. For example, the
"positive inaction" upon which Flood relied was, in part, Congress'
consideration of dozens of proposed bills seeking to modify the rule of
Federal Baseball and its refusal to enact any of them. The rejected
proposal rule is not limited to these cases, however, and has evolved
into an independent doctrine, with its own line of important Supreme
Court cases. "'Few principles of statutory construction are more
compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub
silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in
favor of other language.' " 104 Where a comll1-ittee~ or one chamber of
Congress, or a conference committee has voted against including specific language in a statute or an amendment to & statute, the Court will
often refuse to read that interpretation into the statute.
A leading case is Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 105 One issue in
the case was whether backpay could be awarded to those unnamed
members of a Title VII class action who had not themselves filed
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). The Court held that such relief could be aw~ded in a class
action, even though EEOC charges are normally a prerequisite to obtaining such relief in ordinary lawsuits. The Court noted that all the
circuit courts addressing the issue had so held, and concluded that the
Congress "ratified" those cases when it amended Title VII in 1972. 106
The House version of the 1972 amendment would have barred
backpay to class members who had not filed charges. The Senate
passed a bill without the House provision, based upon its committee
recommendation, which in turn relied on and cited the circuit court
opinions. The conference committee adopted the Senate version and
specifically rejected the House provision. From this evidence, the
Court concluded that the backpay issue was settled. 107
As in most of the rejected proposal cases, the rejection in
Albemarle Paper was made by a subsequent Congress, not the one actually passing the statute being interpreted. An example of a contem104. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (1987) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). Other recent
rejected proposal cases include Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2748-50 (1987); Burlington N. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 107 S. Ct. 1841, 1848 (1987);
United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 & n.6 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers'
Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3045-47 (1986) (plurality opinion); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 685-86 (1981).
105. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
106. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
107. 422 U.S at 414 n.8.
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poraneous rejection is found in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson. 108
The Court held that,,in a lawsuit brought under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) "for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization," 109 an employer could not obtain an injunction against a strike called in violation of a labor-management agreement, because the Norris-LaGuardia
Act bars federal courts from issuing injunctions "in any case involving
or growing out of any labor dispute." 110 The Court relied in part upon
a rejected proposal argument. The conference committee for the 1947
Act rejected a provision in the House bill that would have made the
Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable to suits brought to enforce section
301 duties. 111 "When the repeal of a highly significant law is urged
upon [Congress] and that repeal is rejected after careful consideration
and discussion, the normal expectation is that courts will be faithful to
their trust and abide by that decision." 112
· Albemarle Paper and Sinclair illustrate the Court's willingness to
find significance in a conference committee's rejection of a specific provision; such rejection "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact." 113 The
Court may also infer meaning from the rejection of a specific proposal
or interpretation by one chamber of Congress: "There could hardly be
a clearer indication of congressional agreement" with one interpretation than one chamber's rejection of a proposal to change the settled
interpretation.11 4 In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell 115 for
example, the Court interpreted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 116 which prohibits sex discrimination in federally
funded or assisted programs, to include employment discrimination.
The Court relied upon the broad statutory language and a summary of
the bill by its Senate sponsor as the primary bases for its interpretation, but it also relied upon the Title IX regulations developed by the
108. 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (overruled by Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)).
109. 61 Stat. 156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)).
110. Pub. L. No. 72-65, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1982)).
111. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947); see Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 20509.
112. 370 U.S. at 210.
113. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (conference committee
deleting House language); see cases cited in Appendix 3(A) infra.
114. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 174-75; see cases cited at Appendix 3(B) infra.
115. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
116. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1982)).
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Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which is charged with
implementing Title IX. When the regulations were submitted to Congress for formal examination in 1975, several resolutions were introduced to disapprove the regulations, including one resolution
specifically objecting to the regulations dealing with employment dis-·
crimination. Congress voted down the resolutions, and the Court
found the rejection significant evidence that Congress believed Title
IX includes employment discrimination. 117 In North Haven Board of
Education, the rejected proposal rule reinforced the acquiescence rule,
but in other cases the Court has found significance in one chamber's
rejection of amendments or proposed language, even when there has
been no judicial or agency interpretation in the background. 118
Finally, the Court will sometimes rely upon the rejection of proposed legislation by congressional committees. 119 The leading case is
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 120 The Court held that private parties may not sue those making a stock offering for fraud under
the securities laws when the claimants have neither purchased nor sold
any of the offered shares. The primary argument made by the Court
rested upon the acquiescence rule and the rejected proposal rule. 121
The Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corporation 122 had
so held in 1952, and courts and commentators for two decades accepted this ruling as the settled interpretation. 123 More significantly,
the SEC apparently realized that, and in 1957 and 1959 petitioned
Congress to amend the statute to broaden standing to raise anti-fraud
issues. 124 The Senate Committee on Banking held hearings on the
proposals, which were controversial because they would expand liability under the anti-fraud provisions. The committee did 11:ot recommend the SEC's bills, and they died. "The longstanding acceptance by
the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum 's reasonable interpretation ... argues significantly in fayor of acceptance of the
Birnbaum rule by this Court."12s
In most of the cases where the Court has refused to draw significance from a rejected proposal, it has stressed that the proposal dif'
117. 456 U.S. at 531-35.
118. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 107 S.
Ct. 1841, 1848 (1987); Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 716 n.23 (1974).
119. See cases cited in Appendix 3(C) infra.
120. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
121. 421 U.S. at 732-33.
122. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
123. 421 U.S. at 731-32.
124. 421 U.S. at 732.
125. 421 U.S. at 733.
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fered from the interpretative issue then under consideration~ and
Congress therefore was not faced with a clear referendum on that issue. For example, Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 126 which had interpreted section 1983 not to apply to municipalities. Monroe's main
argument was that the Congress enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871
rejected an amendment that would have subjected municipalities to
liability for damage done by private persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled." Monell demonstrated the irrelevance of that inaction by arguing that the amendment was rejected, not because it
imposed liability on municipalities, but because it held them responsible for the acts of private citizens and, hence, carried respondeat superior too far. 127
Another case refusing to rely upon rejected proposals is NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago. 128 The Court held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not give the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) jurisdiction over educational institutions that are
associated with a religious denomination and teach secular as well as
religious subjects. The dissenting opinion relied upon two rejected
proposal arguments. First, when the NLRA was amended by the
LMRA in 1947, the conference committee rejected a House provision
that would have precluded NLRB jurisdiction over religiously associated educational institutions. 129 Second, when the NLRA was
amended in 1974 to repeal the exclusion of nonprofit hospitals, the
Senate rejected an amendment to exempt hospitals operated by religious groups, arguing that "'national [labor] policy ... holds religiously affiliated institutions . . . to the same standards as their
nonsectarian counterparts.' " 130 The Court found that these rejected
proposals did not reflect any "affirmative intention" of Congress on
this issue because the Board did not assert jurisdiction over churchoperated schools until after 1974.1 31 Hence, there was not a tangible
policy tradition to which Congress could respond.
The legislative inaction argument in Patterson finds substantial
support in these rejected proposal cases. Proposals to exclude section
1981 from employment discrimination litigation were rejected by Congress when it amended Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportu126. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
127. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95.
128. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
129. See 440 U.S. at 513-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. 440 U.S. at 515 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 120 CONG. R.Ec. 12957 (1974) (Sen. Cranston, floor manager of Senate bill)).
131. 440 U.S. at 505-06. I confess that this is a pretty lame response by the Court, and I find
Catholic Bishop a particularly weak case.
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nity Act of 1972. 132 Referring explicitly to the Civil Rights Act of
1866 (hence implicitly.to section 1981), Senator Hruska introduced an
amendment to the Senate bill to make Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination. 133 Senator
Williams, the floor manager for the bill, vociferously opposed the
Hruska amendment, emphasizing the importance of section 1981 as an
"alternative means to redress individual grievances" 134 and vowed that
he would give up the whole bill before allowing the repeal of section
1981. 135 The Senate twice rejected Senator Hruska's amendment. 136
The House bill, however, included a provision making Title VII the
exclusive remedy. 137 In conference committee, the House receded
from its position, and the final version of the statute had no exclusive
remedy provision.13s
The proposal's rejection in 1972 arguably brings Patterson within
the Supreme Court's precedents. The case seems similar to Albemarle
Paper and Sinclair: The rejection of the House repeal of section 1981
(for employment cases) in the conference committee "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact." 139 And like North Haven Board of
Education: The rejection of Senator Hruska's proposal supports the
inference that Congress was aware of, deliberated about, and accepted
the prevailing judicial interpretation of section 1981 as applicable to
private discrimination_- _
132. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17
(1982)).
133. 118 CONG. REC. 3172-73 (1972) (Sen. Hruska).
134. Id. at 3371 (Sen. Williams).
The right of individuals to bring suits in Federal courts to redress individual acts of discrimination ... was first provided by the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. sections
1981, 1983. It was recently stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Mayer, that
these acts provide fundamental constitutional guarantees. In any case, the courts have specifically held that Title VII and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 are not mutually
exclusive, and must be read together to provide alternative means to redress individual
grievances.
Mr. President, the amendment of [Senator Hruska] will repeal the first major piece of
civil rights legislation in this Nation's history. We cannot do that.
Id. (Sen. Williams).
135. Id. at 3963.
136. Id. at 3373, 3965; see also Runyon, 427 at 174 n.11 (discussion of Hruska amendment).
137. See 117 CONG. REc. 31973 (1971) (Rep. Erlenbom) (under substitute bill "[t]here
would no longer be recourse to the old 1866 civil rights act"); id. at 32111 (House vote 200-195
to adopt Erlenbom substitute).
138. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972).
139. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
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INTENT FROM

Based upon the analysis in Part I, one might conclude that the
Supreme Court's legislative inaction decisions are coherent and make
a fair amount of sense out of delphic signals from the legislature.
These conclusions would be hasty. I have made the best effort I can to
present the range of outcomes and the Court's reasoning as coherently
as possible. Thus, Part I emphasized, as the Court does, the legal process context of the legislative inaction in each case: Was Congress
aware of the interpretation, and did it deliberate about it? 140 If so, its
failure to act has interpretive significance, as the Court seems to be
saying in cases like Apex Hosiery, Flood, Snyder, and Sinclair. "There
could hardly be a clearer indication of congressional agreement" with
a particular interpretation, than Congress' focusing on it and failing to
change it, the Court said in Runyon 141 and might say again in
Patterson.
Yet the cases are not as coherent as my summary in Part I might
suggest. Upon close examination, some of the cases might be considered internally incoherent. For example, Bob Jones' invocation of congressional acquiescence in the 1970 IRS interpretation of section
501(c)(3) is inconsistent with Congress' similar acquiescence in exactly
the opposite interpretation before 1970. 142 Indeed, in the 1960s this
issue was certainly a salient one, and at least one bill was introduced to
overturn the prior IRS interpretation (it did not pass). 143 Why should
Congress' silence after 1970 count so much, while its silence before
1970 counts not at all? Bob Jones provides no explanation for this
curiosity. A similar point can be made about Runyon. Its holding
rested upon Congress' acquiescence in Alfred H. Mayer and lower
court decisions extending that precedent to section 1981. Yet the
Court ignored Congress' acquiescence in pre-Alfred H. Mayer decisions that had required a showing of state action for lawsuits under
140. Cf. 2A N. SINGER, supra note 10, § 49.09, at 400 (reenactment rule "is of special importance" where administrative or judicial interpretations are known to Congress and "does not
apply where nothing indicates that the legislature had its attention directed to the administrative
[or judicial] interpretation upon reenactment"); id. § 49.10, at 408 (acquiescence is "of small
consequence where the ... contemporaneous interpretation was not called to the legislatur.::'s
attention" but is "presumptive evidence of its correctness" when the legislature was aware of it).
141. 427 U.S. at 174-75.
142. See Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion & Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United
States, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. I.
143. H.R. 6342, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,printed in 111 CONG. REC. 5140 (1965) ("A bill to
amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that an organization described in section
501(c)(3) of such code which engages in certain discriminatory practices shall be denied an exemption ... .");see Grabow, supra note 9, at 750-51.
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sections 1981 and 1982. 144 Indeed, Congress' enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apparently assumed that victims of
racial discrimination by private sector employers had no federal remedy. Like Bob Jones, Runyon seems capricious in its invocation of legislative inaction.
Other cases are inconsistent with one another. Although Hallock
is the leading anti-acquiescence case, the amount of active legislative
deliberation over the interpretive question seems just as impressive as
that in the leading acquiescence cases, such as Apex Hosiery. Thus,
not only had Congress failed to overrule the Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, but
Congress had reenac~ed it without change and had overruled judicial
interpretations involving other section 302 issues. 145 In short, there
seems to be no procedural reason why the acquiescence arguments
that prevailed in Apex Hosiery should not have prevailed in Hallock or
Girouard. 146 For an even more striking example, Sinclair is one of the
most persuasive inaction cases, because the Congress enacting section
301 specifically rejected (at the conference committee) a proposal to
allow injunctions to enforce section 301 and, pro tanto, to repeal the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Yet the Court eight years later, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 147 overruled Sinclair. The
overruling flies in the face not only of the rejected proposal rule but
also of the acquiescence rule, since Sinclair was a well-publicized decision and proposals were advanced for Congress to overturn it, which
never occurred. 148
There is, finally, incoherence at the level of rhetoric. For every
case where the Court rhapsodizes about deliberative inaction, there is
a counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing critique. "To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds
no light is to venture into speculative unrealities," the Court said in
Hallock, where Congress not only had focused on the interpretive issue, but had changed the statute in other ways. 149 "So what," the
Court seemed to say. "Various considerations of parliamentary tactics
144. The dissenters in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), complained that
its interpretation of§ 1982 overruled holdings of the Court in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31
(1948), and Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926). Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. at 451-52
& n.8 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see 392 U.S. at 419 & 420 n.25 (Court's response). Runyon's
dissenters claimed that its interpretation of§ 1981 overruled dicta in the Civil Rights Cases.
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192 (White, J., dissenting).
145. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 129-32 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
146. Girouard, 328 U.S. 61, 73-76 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
147. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
148. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 240; 398 U.S. at 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
149. 309 U.S. at 119-20.
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and strategy might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the ...
Congress, but they would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on
quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a
controlling legal principle." 150 Hallock is particularly eloquent, but
similar invective can be found in many other opinions rejecting inaction arguments.1s1
·
The rhetorical debate has heated up in the last two years, in part
because recently appointed Justice Scalia is forcefully critical of legislative inaction arguments, the acquiescence rule in particular. 152 The
debate on the Court is epitomized in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County. 153 In that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed United Steelworkers v. Weber, 154 which had interpreted Title
VII to permit voluntary affirmative action in employment. Justice
Scalia dissented in Johnson, arguing that the earlier interpretation was
wrong and had malign policy consequences. 155 The Court brushed
aside this argument in a footnote, observing that "Congress has not
amended the statute to reject our construction, nor have any such
amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that
our interpretation was correct." 156 Justice Scalia responded with various reasons why Congress' failure to amend the statute should have no
significance, concluding that "vindication by congressional inaction is
150. 309 U.S. at 121.
151. My favorite invective is that in Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185·86 n.21 (1969): "The
verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible. . . . Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis." See also Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (1987) ("It is of course not true that
whenever Congress enacts legislation using a word that has a given administrative interpretation
it means to freeze that administrative interpretation in place."); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61,
78 (1974) ("This Court observed in [Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)] that
'[t]he search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage' •••• ");
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 n.11 (1969) ("In any event, unsuccessful
attempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative intent."); United States v. Welden,
377 U.S. 95, 103 n.12 (1964) ("'We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every
time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation.' ") (quoting Jones v. Liberty Glass
Co., 332 U.S. 524, 534 (1947)); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) ("The interpretation placed upon an existing statute by a subsequent group of Congressmen who are promoting
legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive significance here.''); Girouard, 328 U.S. at
69 ("It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling
rule of law.'').
152. For his criticisms of the acquiescence rule, see Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807, 1814
(1987); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1472-73 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2075 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent·
ing). He is willing to rely on the reenactment rule, though. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct.
2541, 2550-51 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
153. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
154. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
155. 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. 107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7.
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a canard." 157 The Court replied that any interpretation of a statute
invites legislative correction, that Congress has overruled other interpretations of Title VII, and that "on occasion an invitation declined is
as significant as one accepted."15s
The Johnson opinion encapsulated the prevailing rhetoric of the
Court's legislative inaction cases with the following example: " •When
a court says to a legislature: ••You (or your predecessor) meantX," it
almost invites the legislature to answer: "We did not."' " 159 And
when the legislature declines the invitation, one can infer that, more
likely than not, it did mean "X." This reasoning suggests a highly
persuasive metaphor for finding meaning in inaction: Wadlington tells
Krattenmaker, "Go fetch n:ie some soupmeat." Krattenmaker fetches
beef, presents it to Wadlington with the query, ••isn't this the kind of
meat you intended?" Wadlington says nothing. Under the acquiescence rule, we can infer that it is more likely than not that Wadlington
did mean beef. Suppose Wadlington issues the same directive every
week for a year, Krattenmaker brings beef every time, and Wadlington
says nothing. Under the reenactment rule, we can infer that it is more
likely than not that Wadlington did mean beef. Finally, suppose
Wadlington's spouse suggests, "Dearest, why don't you have Krattenmaker fetch us some chicken instead of soupmeat?" And yet
Wadlington immediately turns to Krattenmaker and asks only for
"soupmeat." Under the rejected proposal rule, we can infer that it is
more likely than not that Wadlington did mean beef. If one combines
these three scenarios (as in Patterson), the inference is quite powerful.
Wadlington meant beef.
When Johnson and other Supreme Court opinions make inferences
from legislative inaction, they typically assert that these inferences tell
us something probable about the actual "intention" of Congress as to
the certain issue on which Congress has not responded. 160 Congress is
my hypothetical Wadlington. When viewed in this siµiple metaphori157. 107 S. Ct. at 1473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. 107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7.
159. 107 s. Ct. at 1451 n.7 (quoting G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 31-32 (1982)).
160. In addition to Johnson, other legislative inaction decisions from the 1986 Term deployed
similar anthropomorphic terminology. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2762 (1987) (Because of "congressional awareness of this practice, we can
generally assume that Congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law."); Tanner v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2750 (1987) ("Congress specifically understood, considered, and
rejected a version of Rule 606(b) that would have allowed jurors to testify on juror conduct.");
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (1987) (" 'Congress does not intend sub silentio
to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.'") (quoting
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
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cal way, the legislative inaction arguments seem quite good, because
they tell us something about actual legislative intent, which ha:; traditionally been considered highly relevant. when the Court interprets a
statute. Yet in Johnson and other cases, Justice Scalia seizes this metaphor and criticizes it intensely. On the whole, I agree with his critique. While the inferences we draw from the inaction of my
hypothetical Wadlington are reasonable, I do not believe that Congress is very much like Wadlington. It is different in three material
ways: (1) Unlike Wadlington, Congress is a discontinuous decisionmaker. Wadlington is the same person, albeit older, year after
year. Congress turns over every two years, and the "intent" that is
constitutionally most relevant is the intent of the Congress that actually enacted the legislation. (2) Unlike Wadlington, Congress is a collective decisionmaker. While Wadlington may sometimes "be of two
minds," Congress is always of two minds (the House and the Senate),
and each of them contains many different minds. This makes it very
difficult to figure out exactly what the intent of Congress is when it
fails to do something. (3) Unlike Wadlington, Congress is a public
decisionmaker. What Wadlington decides is of little moment, except
to Wadlington and her household. What Congress decides has important consequences for many people and for our own political community. The public decisionmaking process in fact has several systematic
flaws, and we need to be chary of exacerbating those flaws when we
develop theories of interpreting Congress' decisions and indecisions.
The legislative inaction cases may exacerbate some of those flaws.
The remainder of this part explores the implications of these three
differences for the legislative inaction cases. To the extent these cases
claim to tell us something about legislative expectations, they overstate
their claim. To illustrate my criticisms, I shall use Johnson and three
cases from Part I -Flood v. Kuhn, Sinclair, and Patterson. These are
among the strongest cases for legislative inaction arguments, yet in
each case those arguments provide less satisfying proofs of legislative
intent than might appear at first glance. I conclude that legislative
inaction rarely tells us much about relevant legislative intent. The
most persuasive cases under this approach are the rejected proposal
cases, such as Sinclair, where the enacting Congress in conference
committee rejected a proposal similar to the interpretation rejected by
the Court. (Ironically, of course, Sinclair has been overruled.) Not all
rejected proposal arguments work, though, and I consider the rejected
proposal arguments in Patterson and Flood unpersuasive. Reenactment arguments can sometimes be persuasive under an actual intent
approach, and the reenactment argument in Patterson is not a bad one.
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Acquiescence arguments are almost never persuasive indicia of actual
legislative intent, and their invocation in cases like Flood and Johnson
only highlights flaws in the legislative process.

A. Legislative Structures: Formalist Problems with Inferring
Legislative Intent from Legislative Inaction
An important formal problem with most of the legislative inaction
cases is that they are inconsistent with the traditional proposition that
the legislative "intent,, relevant to .statutory interpretation is the intent
of the enacting Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent Congresses.161 Doctrinally, this proposition underlies the rule that "subsequent legislative history,, is not an authoritative source in statutory
interpretation. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held
that " 'the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one.' " 162 Formally, the job of Congress ends when it passes the statute, and "it is the function of the
courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of one House
of the Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means." 163 Functionally, subsequent legislative history is highly unreliable and subject
to strategic manipulation. 164 "Thus, even when it would otherwise be
useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable
interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and
legislative history prior to its enactment." 165
161. Note that a growing body ofliterature argues that legislative intent is not the only thing
courts will or ought to consider when they interpret statutes. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 31354 (1986); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Dynamic Statutory Interpretation]; see Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. R.E.v. 20, 108 (1988). My view is that historical legislative intent is relevant to statutory interpretation, for both formalist and functionalist reasons. Ongoing legislative consideration of an interpretive issue is, in my view, relevant information for a court to consider, but not as
formally important as is the enacting legislature's intent.
162. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411
n.11 (1979); W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
757-59 (1987).
163. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (1988).
164. Even contemporaneous legislative history may be unreliable and subject to manipulation. As legislators and lobbyists have begun to understand how much courts use legislative
history, posturing and fabrication have become possible. The fight, if lost on the language of the
statute, moves to the language of the committee report or perhaps to getting a scripted colloquy
entered into the Congressional Record. The hope is that an unfavorable but likely interpretation
will be limited, if not excluded, by the extra-statutory information.
165. Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980);
see also Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 107 S. Ct. 750, 761 (1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2342-43 (1987); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367,
378 n.17 (1984); Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom & in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 809-10 (1983) (relying on postenactraent statements "risk[s] repealing legislation ••. without going through the constitutionally prescribed processes for repeal"); Wald,
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The Court's disapproval of subsequent legislative history is ultimately rooted in the procedural structures for statutory law found in
the Constitution. Pursuant to articles I and VI, federal statutes are
our supreme law (assuming they are constitutional), trumping and displacing the common law and state law. The supremacy of statutes,
however, is accompanied by elaborate procedural requirements.
Before something is an authoritative legislative enactment, entitled to
supremacy, it must be passed by both chambers of Congress in the
same form, and signed by the President (or passed over a veto). 166
Thus, nonbinding resolutions, passed by both Houses of Congress but
not presented to the President, are not formally entitled to authoritative weight in statutory interpretation. 16 7
The acquiescence and most of the rejected proposal cases directly
conflict with these propositions. If subsequent legislative statements
directly supporting a statutory interpretation are not valid evidence,
how can subsequent legislative silence, usually just indirectly supporting a statutory interpretation, be considered any more authoritative?
As a formal matter, "in view of the specific and constitutional procedures required for the enactment of legislation, it would seem hardly
justifiable to treat as having legislative effect any action or nonaction
not taken in accordance with the prescribed procedures." 168 Thus, in
Flood v. Kuhn, the "positive inaction" the Court found critically important related to unsuccessful bills introduced between 1957 and
1965. 169 The Court's conclusion that "Congress as yet has had no
intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes" 170 is doctrinally suspect. In none of the more than fifty
bills that Congress considered did both Houses agree; hence, there was
no article I legislative enactment entitled to authoritative consideration by the Court. The only authoritative legislative enactment pertinent to the case was the original Sherman Act of 1890 that broadly
prohibits restraints of trade in "interstate commerce," which baseball
Some Observations on the Use ofLegislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 lowA L.
REV. 195, 205 (1983) ("While follow-up congressional intent may become relevant if expressed
in a positive legislative act, it is particularly risky to draw inferences from subsequent refusals to
act."). But cj Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (subsequent
committee report may be given some weight when intent of enacting Congress is "obscure").
166. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (enforcing the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I to invalidate legislative vetoes, in which one House of Congress could
create law by overturning an agency decision); Grabow; supra note 9, at 74()-48.
167. See Grabow, supra note 9, at 748 (citing recent example).
168. Cleveland v. United States, 329 ~J.S. 14, 22 n.4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
169. Flood. 401 U.S. at 281-82. The Court also mentioned two statutes which expanded the
antitrust exemption, but did not argue that the statutes or their legislative history had any direct
bearing on the question of baseball's general exemption from the Sherman Act.
170. 407 U.S. at 283.
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has clearly been engaged in for some time,· a fact explicitly recognized
in Flood. 171
So, too, most of the primary rejected proposal cases - Albemarle
Paper, North Haven Board of Education, and Blue Chip Stamps - are
formally suspect, because the proposals were rejected after the relevant
statute was enacted. Of course, this formal criticism does not apply to
Sinclair, because in that case the rejected proposal was in connection
with the original statute (LMRA section 301) being interpreted by the
Court. The conference committee's rejection of an exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is, therefore, relevant legislative history, and
not questionable subsequent history. The irony is that the Court overruled Sinclair eight years later in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770. 172 The latter opinion did not even mention the conference committee's rejection of the rule it adopted.
Insofar as they are said to be evidence of actual legislative intent,
the legislative inaction arguments in Patterson are subject to the formalist objections discussed above. The argument that Congress has
acquiesced in Runyon because it has not overturned it is of questionable formal relevance. The formal question is whether the text and
legislative history of section 1981 itself support Runyon, a question
that is harder for the Patterson petitioner. 173 Similarly, the 1972 rejection of the Hruska amendment by the Senate, and the conference committee rejection of the House provision repealing section 1981 in
employment discrimination cases, would not be relevant to the interpretation of Congress' intent in 1866.
The most persuasive argument would be that based upon section
1988, as amended in ·1976 by the Fees Act, because it is based upon a
statute actually passed by Congress and formally entitled to
supremacy. The reenactment cases are not subject to the formalist
objections. The problem is that the Fees Act is not quite a reenactment of section 1981. It only builds upon section 1981, as interpreted
in Runyon. Is this enough? Perhaps. "Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction." 174 While the Fees Act does not state, "Section
171. 407 U.S. at 282 ("Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce.").
172. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
173. But not insuperable. Though I have not researched the issue, I find the historical argument in the Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 5-71, to be well-reasoned. See also Brief Amicus
Curiae of Eric Foner, John H. Franklin, Louis R. Harlan, Stanley N. Katz, C. Vann Woodward
& Mary Frances Berry, Patterson (No. 87-107), which presents the views ofleading historians on
this issue.
174. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969); see also Consumer
Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980).
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1981 covers private as well as public discrimination," Congress included section 1981 because it wanted to encourage section 1981 lawsuits, just as it had encouraged Title VII lawsuits with a counsel fees
provision. 175 This intention rested upon the assumption that "the
remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive
with the individual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981." 176 In short, Congress apparently was relying upon Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 when it
amended section 1988, and that reliance is entitled to some consideration even under the formalist position outlined here.1 77

B. Indeterminacy of Collective Intent: Realist Problems with
Inferring Legislative Intent from Legislative Inaction
Even if subsequent legislative inaction were formally relevant or
authoritative evidence of legislative intent, there would be problems of
inference. What, in fact, does the inaction mean? It was not difficult
for !JS to infer that the individual Wadlington probably meant for
K.rattenmaker to fetch beef when she requested "soupmeat," at least
after the first fetching. It is more difficult to make such probabilistic
inferences for a large collection of people, especially when their decisionmaking is as structured as that in Congress. There are two dimensions to this problem. First, it is very hard to aggregate preferences in
such a large collection of people. 178 Very few of them express their
views in legislative debates or committee reports, and when they cast
their votes, it is not always easy to figure out what they mean by those
votes.
Second, the structure of Congress makes it far more likely that
something will not happen (inaction) than that it will (action). 179 In175. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908.
176. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.8 (1976). After quoting the language in text, the 1976 Fees Act House report
observed: "That view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency," 421 U.S. 454 (1975), which had squarely held that§ 1981 applied to private discrimina·
tion and was reaffirmed in Runyon.
, 177. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686 n.7 (1979) (provision of counsel fees
for Title IX lawsuits in congressional amendment to § 1988 supports implication of a private
cause of action under Title IX); see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300.01 (1981) (congressional
acquiescence is persuasive when Congress relied on interpretation in crafting other statutes);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-82 (1981) (similar); Montana Wilderness Assn. v.
United States Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
178. See K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); D. BLACK,
THE THEORIES OF CoMMITIEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND
SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
179. Standard works on the procedural obstacles to proposed legislation include R. DAVIDSON & W. 0LESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS (2d ed. 1985); W. 0LESZEK, CONGRES·
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ertia is the main reason for this phenomenon. The legislative agenda is
severely limited; to gain a place on that agenda, a measure must not
only have substantial support, but be considered urgent by key people
(such as the President and/or the party leadership in Congress). 180
Even if a proposal finds a place on the legislative agenda, it is usually
doomed if there is substantial opposition, whether or not most legislators favor it, because of the variety of procedural roadblocks opponents may erect. A bill can effectively be killed by a hostile committee
or subcommittee chair in either chamber, by a hostile House or Senate
leadership, by a hostile Rules Committee in the House or by a filibuster in the Senate. Consequently, even if a majority of the members of
Congress disagree with a judicial or administrative interpretation of a
statute, it is very unlikely that they will be able to amend the statute
quickly, if at all. 181
Given the variety of reasons, unrelated to the merits or legislative
support, for the failure of an idea or a measure in Congress, Justice
Frankfurter was surely right when he opined in Hallock that such considerations "indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in
the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle." 182
Consider the evidence in Flood v. Kuhn. On two occasions one chamber of Congress passed bills that would have expanded baseball's antitrust exemption to include other athletic activities, and based upon
this evidence the Court reaffirmed its finding in Toolson that " 'ConSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS (2d ed. 1984); R. RIPLEY, CONGRESS:
PROCESS AND POLICY (1975); R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY
AND PUBLIC POLICY (4th ed. 1987).
180. See generally J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984).
181. An excellent recent example of this phenomenon is the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Act overturned Grove City College v. Bell,
465 U.S. SSS (1984), which interpreted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to bar sex
discrimination only in programs which received federal aid, not in all programs of institutions
receiving federal aid. From the beginning there were very few defenders of the Court's decision,
and several bills were introduced to overturn it. 130 CONG. REc. 3661-62 (1984). One bill
passed the House but was killed by a Senate filibuster. 130 CoNG. REC. 84585 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1984). (It takes sixty votes in the Senate to cut off a filibuster.) A similar Senate bill in the same
Congress was tabled after parliamentary impasse near the end of the session. 130 CONG. REc.
S12640-43 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984). In the next Congress, the Senate bill was not reported out of
committee. S. REP. No. 64, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1988). Two committees favorably reported
a House bill, H.R. REP. No. 963, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. parts 1 & 2 (1986), but the bill was never
called up before the full House. (Unless a bill is specially expedited by the Rules Committee, it is
unlikely to be called up in its tum.) In the next Congress, fifty-one Senators sponsored a bill to
overturn the decision, 133 CoNG. REC. S2249-S6 (daily ed. Feb.19, 1987), yet it took a year
before the bill passed the Senate, 134 CoNG. REC. S266 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988), and the House.
134 CoNG. REc. HS97-98 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988). The President vetoed the bill, and Congress
overrode the veto. 134 CoNG. REc. S276S (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988); 134 CoNG. REc. H1071-72
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988). It is remarkable that it took four years of procedural maneuvering to
overrule a Supreme Court decision that, from all I can tell, never had much support in Congress.
182. Hallock, 309 U.S. at 121.
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gress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the
scope of the federal antitrust laws.' " 183 There are, however, several
different inferences that could be drawn from Congress' reaction to the
Court's decisions:l84
(1) Legislators approved of the Court's decisions and were only
divided on the question of whether and how far to expand them to
other athletic activities.
(2) Legislators in one chamber approved of the Court's decisions
only if they were applicable to all professional athletics (which the
Court held was not the case), on grounds of fairness. Legislators in
the other chamber either
(a) approved of the Court's decisions for baseball only and
did not want them expanded to other sports, or
(b) disapproved of the Court's decisions entirely and did not
want them expanded at all.
(3) Legislators in one chamber approved of the Court's decisions,
while legislators in the other chamber did not care enough about
the issue to consider it.
(4) Legislators in neither chamber approved of the Court's deci..
sions, but on two occasions one chamber voted for an expansion of
the decisions in order to placate the special interests of team owners in baseball and other sports. On each occasion, the chamber
understood that the other chamber would not go along.
Of these possible inferences, only the first one supports Flood's conclusion that Congress "has no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes.'' Inferences two and four
strongly cut against the Court's decision, because they suggest legislative unhappiness with the unequal treatment of baseball and othersports. The Court suggests no reason to prefer the first inference to
the fourth, and there is every reason to believe that the first is less
likely than the second and fourth together.
The problems with the acquiescence and rejected proposal arguments in Flood are generalizable, because Flood is a relatively strong
case for theit invocation. A similar analysis can be used in other
cases. 185 For example, the acquiescence and rejected proposal argu183. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953) (per curiam)). The Court also used this evidence to conclude that Congress has had no
desire to disapprove of Federal Baseball legislatively. That is obvious but cuts against the
Court's position unless it also concludes that Congress approved of the decision.
184. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 9, at 1395-96.
185. Farber, supra note 68, at 10, argues that "probability theory indicates that, no matter
how many other causes of congressional silence may exist, silence is still a signal of congressional
approval." He supports his assertion with an example using two urns, one with only white mar-
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ments in Patterson are even more vulnerable, as suggested by an analysis of Congress' refusal to cut back on the ambit of section 1981 in
connection with its 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Start with Senator Hruska's proposed amendment in the Senate. The
amendment did not single out section 1981, nor did it posit that section 1981 should be reinterpreted to apply only to public discrimination.186 Senator Hruska offered the amendment because then-current
law permitted a "multiplicity of actions to be instituted against a respondent before a number of separate and distinct forums for the same
alleged offense." 187 While section 1981 was apparently one of the
"multiplicity of actions" concerning Senator Hruska, neither he nor
his amendment expressed an opinion on the ambit of section 1981.
The Senate bill expanded Title VII to cover discrimination by state
and local governments against their employees, and so section 1981
was a relevant statute however it was interpreted. Those voting
against the Hruska amendment were, at most, following the dictates of
the bill's sponsors not to remove section 1981 from _the employment
arena. 188 In short, rejection of the Hruska amendment tells us little
about what anyone thought about section 198l's application to private
discrimination.
Assume, as the Court did in Runyon, 189 that the vote on the
bles and another with half white, half black marbles. Id. at 10, n.38. We are presented with a
white marble. Though we don't know which um produced the marble, it is probably the first
urn. "Similarly," Farber concludes, "although congressional silence could result from either
congressional approval or other factors, it still increases the likelihood of congressional approval." Id. The flaw in this analysis is that Farber has stacked the urns, by giving us only two
(Congress either approves or disapproves) and assuming there is an equal number of marbles in
each (his inference doesn't work if the second urn has twice as many marbles as the first).
Consider a more realistic variation on Farber's example. White marbles indicate that Congress will not overturn (black marbles indicate that it will). Three urns represent Congress' .
possible attitudes toward an interpretation. Urn 1 stands for Congress' positive approval of the
interpretation and has four white marbles (there is no way Congress will overturn the interpretation). Urn 2 stands for Congress' disapproval of the interpretation; it has two white and two
black marbles (50-50 chance of overturning, depending on procedural obstacles). Urn 3 stands
for Congress' apathy or ignorance of the interpretation; it has 44 white marbles and six black
marbles (Congress may do something but very probably won't). We are presented with a white
marble. Can we infer that it came from Urn 1 (Congress approves of the interpretation)? No.
There is a 92% probability that it came from Um 2 or 3 (Congress disapproved or was unaware).
While Farber's argument is "brilliant," see Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 917 (1986), it is not persuasive.
186. See 118 CONG. REc. 3173 (1972) (text of Hruska amendment).
187. Id. at 3172. One example of this "multiplicity" was that of a lawsuit by a black employee against an employer, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, id. at 3173, but Senator
Hruska did not explain whether the employer was private or public.
188. Additionally, those voting against the amendment may have thought it unnecessary,
since modem principles of res judicata would protect companies against seriation ell!ployment
discrimination lawsuits. See id. at 3370 (Sen. Javits).
189. 427 U.S. at 174 n.11. Runyon characterized the defeat of the Hruska amendment as a
referendum on the Alfred H. Mayer interpretation of the Civil Rights i\ct of f86(i, w,hiph is not
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Hruska amendment was somehow a referendum on section 198l's applicability to private discrimination. The argument is still problematic. While Runyon correctly says that "Senator Hruska's proposed
amendment was rejected," 190 it does not mention that the amendment
failed on a tie vote - thirty-three Senators voting for it, and thirtythree Senators voting against it. 191 Indeed, there were actually thirtyfour Senators on the floor voting in favor of the amendment, which
means that a majority of those Senators present supported the amendment. But the thirty-fourth Senator announced that he was a live pair
for an absent Senator. 192 It is highly unusual for a Senator to agree to
be a live pair when it affects the outcome, 193 and I suspect that some
deal had been worked out by the Senate Democratic leadership to save
the bill from the Hruska amendment. 194 In any event, with at least
half the voting Senators agreeing with the Hruska amendment, Runyon's attempt to use it to prove legislative intent is questionable.
Although Runyon did not mention it, a better argument for its position would have been the rejection of a similar proposal by the conference committee that assembled the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act in 1972. Like the Senate Labor & Public Welfare
Committee, the House Education & Labor Committee had reported a
bill which preserved existing remedies and refused to make Title VII
the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. 19 5 Unlike its
Senate counterpart, though, the House committee was unable to prevent its version from being amended. Indeed, the committee bill was
replaced on the floor of the House with a substitute that contained
the case, for the reasons suggested in the text. For support, the Court quoted Senator Williams:
" 'It was recently stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Mayer, that these acts
[sections 1981 and 1983] provide fundamental constitutional guarantees.'" 427 U.S. at 174 n.11
(quoting 118 CONG. REC. 3371 (1972)). Apart from Senator Williams' confusion about the hold·
ing in Alfred H. Mayer (which interpreted § 1982, not§ 1981), that quotation is odd support for
the Court, since Senator Williams lumps together§§ 1981 and 1983 and characterizes them as
protecting "constitutional" rights - which are normally only applicable to public and not pri·
vate discrimination. The one or two Senators who were really listening to Senator Williams
might have assumed the opposite of the Court's point-that§ 1981, like§ 1983, applies only to
public discrimination!
190. 427 U.S. at 174 n.11.
191. 118 CONG. REC. 3373 (1972) (roll call vote, listing Senators).
192. Id. at 3372.
193. W. OLESZEK, supra note 179, at 184.
194. Indeed, the live pair, Senator Gambrell, moved for reconsideration, which allowed the
leadership to muster its forces next time around. The motion was easily defeated, 37 Senators
favoring reconsideration, 50 opposed. 118 CONG. REC. 3965 (1972).
195. R.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971) (rejecting efforts within the com·
mittee to make Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination, and reaffirming
the applicability of§ 1981).
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(inter alia) an exclusivity provision. 196 In the conference committee,
the House receded from its version, and the Senate nonexclusivity position prevailed. While Sinclair and Albemarle Paper suggest that this
ought to be a decisive argument for the Runyon result, it is subject to
some doubt, based upon a realistic appraisal of the legislative process.
As was the case with the failure of the Hruska amendment, we
have no clear explanation from the official records for why the Senate
position prevailed over the House position. The explanation probably
was the conference committee's desire to have a broad range of federal
and state remedies for employment discrimination. Such an explanation and the conference committee's choice of nonexclusivity are, of
course, perfectly consistent with the view that section 1981 only covers
public discrimination, because the final bill extended Title VII coverage to state and local employees. 197 More importantly, there is a likely
procedural explanation for why the Senate position prevailed. The
custom, followed in 1972, is to appoint as conferees on important legislation members of the relevant committee in each chamber. 198 The
conference committee for the 1972 Act consisted of members of the
House Education & Labor Committee, a majority of whom had opposed the exclusivity provision in committee and on the House
floor, 19 9 plus members of the Senate Labor & Public Welfare Committee, an overwhelming majority of whom had voted against the Hruska
amendment. 200 Given this composition, of course the conference committee was going to preserve all existing remedies. But the choice
made by an unrepresentative collection of conferees (on this issue)
ought not be given any significance in discerning the intent of
Congress.
. . 196. The House adopted the substitute by a close vote of200 to 195. 117 CONG. REc. 32111
(1971).
197. Indeed, in its explanation of the expansion of Title VII to cover public employees, the
House Committee said that "the individual's right to file a civil action in his own behalf, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 is in no way affected."
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2137, 2154. This is strange, since the report identifies § 1981 with the 1870 Act, which only
applied to state actors, and not the 1866 Act, which applied to private parties as well. However,
the report, several sentences later, identifies § 1981 with the 1866 Act.
198. W. OLESZEK, supra note 179, at 207. "Who gets named a conferee (or who is passed
over) sometimes can be critical to conference outcomes." Id. at 209.
199. Of the 20 Representatives named to the Conference, 118 CONG. REc. 5187 (1972), 11
(all but one of the Democrats) had voted against the Erlenborn substitute, which added the
exclusivity provision. 117 CoNG. REC. 32111 (1971).
200. Of the 12 Senators named to the Conference, 118 CONG. REC. 5184 (1972), 10 voted
against the Hruska amendment. Id. at 3373. One conferee voted for the amendment, and one
was absent. Id. at 3372.
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C. Dysfunctions in the Legislative Process: Systemic Problems with
Inferring Legislative Intent from Legislative Inaction
The analysis in this part has suggested that, on closer examination,
the legislative inaction arguments in most of the leading cases do not
often tell us much about relevant legislative intent. I want to conclude
the analysis by raising a larger policy issue: If the Supreme Court
seriously applies the various legislative inaction doctrines, it may be
exacerbating dysfunctions that exist in the legislative process. In the
previous section, I dealt with one dysfunction, inertia. Congress' failure to be more active in dealing with public problems is perceived by
many to be a substantial institutional failing, and the Court's willingness to draw overbroad conclusions from Congress' lapses expands
upon the already malign consequences of this dysfunction.
Another institutional dysfunction of Congress is suggested by analysis of the legislative inaction arguments in Flood and Johnson. In
Flood, the baseball owners argued that since virtually all of the legislative activity after Toolson had sought to expand baseball's antitrust
immunity to other sports, it would be anomalous for the Court to
eliminate that immunity, 201 and it is likely that this argument was a
persuasive one to the Court. The Court itself in Johnson advanced a
similar argument to defend its position that Congress' failure to overrule Weber represented acquiescence in the decision. 202 Just before
Weber, Congress had responded to an equally controversial Supreme
Court interpretation of Title VII, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 203
That case held that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition did not
apply to an employer's failure to provide pregnancy benefits as part of
an otherwise comprehensive health care package; within two years,
Congress overruled Gilbert through the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978.204 One of the amid in Patterson argues that Congress'
failure to overrule Runyon is particularly significant, given its willingness to overrule other judicial interpretations of civil rights statutes,
such as Gilbert. 205
These arguments have a strong appeal. If one can show substantial
congressional activity in a given subject area - civil rights or application of antitrust principles to professional sports - then concerns
about legislative inertia and inactivity seem less persuasive. The prob201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Respondents' Brief at 33-36, Flood (No. 71-32).
107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7.
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
42 u.s.c. § 2000e(k) (1982).
Lawyers' Committee Brief, supra note 8, at 11-13.
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lem with these arguments is that even when the legislature does respond, its pattern of response is biased in favor of well-organized (and
frequently wholly unrepresentative) groups. Consider two influential
lines of political theory, and then reconsider the arguments made in
Flood, Johnson, and Patterson.
Public choice theory, the application of economic insights to political behavior,206 suggests several intriguing principles. Public choice
theory assumes that legislators are primarily motivated by a desire to
be reelected. Such legislators are confronted with the "dilemma of the
ungrateful electorate" - that is, an axiom of human nature under
which voters and interest groups will remember the things the legislator did to hurt them more strongly than they will remember the things
done for their benefit. Given this calculus of human nature, legislators
will try to avoid conflictual issues; hence, their activity will focus on
passing laws that help as many organized groups as possible, without
hurting other organized groups. This would not be so bad if organized
groups represented a broad range of interests, but public choice theory
also predicts that groups tend to organize in a selective and often arbitrary way. Groups are more likely to organize when they are small,
wealthy, and well-defined; once they are formed, such groups will
work intensely to seek concentrated benefits (such as subsidies) for
themselves and to avoid concentrated costs (such as user fees). Conversely, groups will not so often organize to seek legislation that distributes benefits to the general population, or to avoid generally shared
costs. Typically, the disorganized general public is not even aware of
when its ~nterests are being compromised.
The gloomy conclusion of public choice theory - prevalence of
special interest groups and legislator reluctance to offend them - is
made gloomier by the insights of institutional process theorists about
"subgovemments."207 According to these theorists, decisions distributing benefits to private groups are generally made by subgovemtnents, that is, House and Senate committees and subcommittees,
relevant bureaucrats and executive officers, and private lobbyists for
the benefited groups. Because of their low visibility and ties to organized interests (which, public choice theory teaches, are formed selectively), subgovemments tend to pander to special viewpoints and are
not necessarily broadly representative.
206. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications ofPublic Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 14 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988) [hereinafter Politics Without Romance]; Farber &
Frickey, The Jurisprudence ofPublic Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873 (1987) (balanced analysis of
the limitations of public choice theory).
207. See R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, supra note 179, at 1-31..
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Reconsider the post-Toolson legislative activity in this light. The
obvious reason why the. activity focused on expanding the antitrust
exemption to other sports is that no one was pressuring Congress to
eliminate baseball's exemption, while strong organized pressure was
applied to expand it. Baseball owners were well-organized and would
have lobbied hard against any effort to take away their exemption, and
owners in other professional sports were just as well-organized to obtain similar treatment for their sports. These groups fit the classic
public, choice pattern - small, homogenous, and wealthy - as the
groups most likely to organize. Those hurt by baseball's exemption the millions who bought overpriced tickets each year and watched the
sport on television - were unlikely to organize because they were generally ignorant of their injury and because individual stakes were very
small. Even baseball players, a smaller and discrete group harmed by
the antitrust exemption (the reserve clause), were not politically organized until after 1966.208 Consequently, the relevant subgovernment between 1957 and 1965, when the legislative activity occurred,
wanted only to help the owners, because they were virtually the only
organized "players" in the legislatiye ballgame. There was no pressure
on legislators to help consumers and ballplayers; because they were
not well-organized, they were effectively marginalized in the political
process. Under these circumstances, Congress was not going to overturn Toolson. Its failure to do anything says nothing about its approval of the gap in antitrust enforcement created in such a blundering
fashion by the Court and, instead, represents a prudent reluctance to
cave in to special interest demands to expand the exemption.
For similar reasons, Congress is highly unlikely to overturn Weber.
The relevant subgovernment consists of well-organized minority and
civil rights groups209 and sympathetic members of the Judiciary Committees in both Houses of Congress. 210 So long as the civil rights
208. The Major League Players Association was formed in 1954, but it did not become a
major force until after 1966. Players were not better organized, in part because they were just
not politically alert and had substantially more allegiance to their teams (and hence to the owners
of their teams) than to their group, before the 1960s. In the 1970s the players were much better
organized and were able to eliminate the reserve clause through arbitration.
209. Note that blacks, the primary beneficiary group of Weber, are a classic group for political organization (now that barriers to political participation have been removed). While they are
numerous, they are "discrete and insular,'' which facilitates their organization. See Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
210. The House Judiciary Committee has been chaired by liberal Representative Rodino in
this time frame and has been controlled by liberal Democrats with close ties to the civil rights
lobby. The Senate Judiciary Committee for six years was chaired by Senator Thurmond, once a
bitter foe of civil rights and now at best acquiescent. Even in this period, the civil rights lobby
could count on a committee majority (the Democrats, plus liberal Republican Senators Specter
and Mathias) in key situations.
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lobby intensely favors Weber, very few members of Congress are going
to tamper with it, and the legislative committees will fight them if they
try. Conversely, there is no organized political demand to overturn
Weber. Unions and employers (highly organized groups) benefit from
Weber, because it allows them to escape potentially costly Title VII
lawsuits. Those hurt by Weber - blue collar white males - are diffuse and ill-organized politically. In short, contrary to the Court's
opinion in Johnson, the legislative response to Gilbert is not surprising,
nor is the nonresponse to Weber. 211 While both decisions were controversial, only Gilbert hurt a group active in the political process, and so
it is not surprising that only it was overtumed. 2 12
Under this framework, Patterson is an intermediate case. Runyon's vulnerability falls between that of Gilbert and that of Weber.
Like Weber, Runyon benefitted well-organized minority groups who
have powerful allies in the relevant subgovemment. Like Gilbert, and
unlike Weber, Runyon hurt well-organized employer groups, which
disliked the broader employment discrimination relief afforded by sec~
tion 1981. They were able to present their position to Congress in
1972 (when lower court decisions clearly signaled the coming of Runyon), and they lost.
This analysis suggests that in cases like Johnson and Flood the acquiescence argument is particularly questionable as a basis for inferring legislative intent. Acquiescence is the rule and not the exception,
whatever Congress' feelings about a Supreme Court decision; and legislative overruling is as much controlled by political calculations as by
any judgment on the merits. If the Court is going to make inferences
about legislative intent based upon acquiescence, 213 I urge that the
211. I disagree with the characterization of my position by Farber, supra note 68, at 11 n.39.
I posit two reasons why no bills were even introduced to overturn Weber: (1) groups benefitting
from the decision were better organized than victims (the explanation Farber attributes to me),
coupled with (2) the dilemma of the ungrateful electorate and the strong aversion most legislators
have to antagonizing important interest groups (an explanation Farber does not attribute to me).
212. I speak only in terms of probability. I am undertaking an empirical study of congressional responses to judicial statutory interpretations and have discovered that Congress does
often respond to judicial decisions; though the legislative response is biased, it is not perfectly
predictable. Recall the long fight to overturn Grove City, recounted in note 181 supra. The
opposition of the President and other important public figures, based in part on ideological
grounds, is one of the political imponderables that the public choice calculations do not precisely
anticipate. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 206, at 319-22.
213. The analysis also raises some questions (albeit less serious ones) about the reenactment
cases. When Congress reenacts a statute, or enacts related legislation (such as the Fees Act), it
has few incentives to reexamine issues "settled" by Supreme Court decisions. Unless virtually all
of the relevant organized groups agree that the Court's decision is wrong or unless the groups
favoring the Court's decision can be placated in the logrolling process, tampering with the
Court's decision will add unnecessary complications to the process of enactment, which is hard
enough as it is.
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Court consider whether the "losers" in the initial interpretation had
effective access to the political process to urge reconsideration. If they
did not - as in Flood and Johnson - then the Court should be more
reluctant to find any kind of legislative approval of the decision. In
my view, this reluctance does not extend to the issue in Patterson, because the losers in Runyon were well organized and had their opportunity to make their case before Congress.
III.

THE RELEVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE INACTION: THE
PRESUMED CORRECTNESS OF BUILDING BLOCK
INTERPRETATIONS

Based upon the arguments in Part II, I believe that legislative inaction usually tells us very little about actual legislative intent. If my
skepticism about the usefulness of legislative inaction as evidence of
legislative intent is correct, then what can be made of the dozens of
Supreme Court cases that rely on legislative inaction as positive evidence in statutory interpretation? Are they all wrong? Their rhetoric
about legislative intention is subject to question if they are referring to
"actual intent," but the cases can be explained by reference to a better
idea, "presumed intent." My thesis is that what the Court is doing in
these cases is to place upon Congress the institutional burden of responding to "building block" agency and judicial interpretations of
statutes when Congress disagrees with them. Building block interpretations, as I am using the term, are authoritative, well-settled interpretations upon which public and/or private parties reasonably rely to
carry out their roles under the statute. If Congress does nothing, the
Court feels free to presume (rebuttably of course) that an agency and/
or judicial building block interpretation is the correct one. This presumed intent approach explains the cases pretty well and is consistent
with our constitutional traditions. I believe there are normative
problems with this descriptive model and argue, further, that the legislative inaction doctrines ought to be applied somewhat more cautiously than they have been in the past. These normative problems do
not apply to.Patterson, however, and I fully endorse their application
to reaffirm Runyon.
A. Rethinking the Legislative Inaction Cases: Presumed Intent and
the Legislative Burden of Response
Although the rhetoric of the legislative inaction cases usually emphasizes legislative intent, as an actual collective intent like that of my
hypothetical Wadlington, there is no inherent reason why the legal
significance oflegislative inaction must be tied to actual intent. To the
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contrary, the significance of inaction in legal doctrine is not necessarily
based upon an actor's actual intent anyway, but typically is based
upon the actor's failure to fulfill a legally defined duty. For example,
criminal liability in Anglo-American law does not attach simply because an actor fails to save a dying person, even if the actor's intention
is malicious - unless there is a statutory or common law duty for the
actor to do something. 214 In Anglo-American contract law, silence is
usually not acceptance of an offer even if intended to be - unless the
parties' relationship or a statute has created a duty to respond negatively if the offeree wants to decline. 215 Perhaps the best public law
example is the President's use of the veto power. If the President does
not veto a bill passed by Congress within ten days, the inaction is
deemed an approval of the bill, which becomes law whatever the President's actual intent or the reason for the President's failure to act. 216
One reading of the legislative inaction cases is that once courts, the
executive, or .an agency has interpreted a statute, the burden is upon
Congress to respond to the interpretation if it disagrees with it. If
Congress does nothing to disturb the interpretation, the Court is free
to presume that the interpretation was correct. This reading of the
legislative inaction cases often appears in their rhetoric. Thus, the
Court sometimes states the reenactment doctrine: "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute
without change."217 And the acquiescence doctrine: "But once an
agency's [or the Court's] statutory construction has been 'fully
brought to the attention of the public and the Congress,' and the latter
has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the
statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has
214. See generally Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REV. 615 (1942); Kleinig,
Criminal Liability for Failures To Act, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 161;
Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the Law in the
United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101 (1984).
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 69(1) (1979); Comment, The Language
of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 217-20
(1986).
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. This constitutional duty does not inhere when Congress is in
recess. Cf Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987)
(President is bound by ten-day rule during intra-session congressional recesses).
217. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (emphasis added); see Pierce v. Underwood,
108 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (1988) (following Lorillard presumption instead of language of House
committee report); Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 359 (1986) ("'if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific' ") (quoting Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986)); Girouard, 328 U.S. at 76 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("It is the responsibility of Congress, in
reenacting a statute, to make known its purpose in a controversial matter of interpretation of its
former language.").
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been correctly disceined." 218 And the rejected proposal rule: "One
must assume that a deliberate policy decision informed Congress' rejection of these alternatives in favor of the language presently contained in [the statute]."219 The presumption suggested by this rhetoric
can be rebutted by showing that there was no authoritative interpretation of which Congress should have been aware, or that Congress did
in fact send some signals of disapproval. The presumption becomes
conclusive_ by showing that Congress did in fact approve of the
interpretation.
If the relevant intent is a presumed intent arising out of an institutional responsibility, what is the source of the responsibility? The apparent policy basis for this responsibility is our legal system's desire
for continuity in the law, a concern that also animates stare decisis. 220
Continuity is desirable for at least three reasons. 221 First, it contributes to our overall sense of security and to the legitimacy of law as
something that does not unduly vacillate. Second, persons subject to
legal rules often rely on those rules when structuring their activities.
If the rules changed abruptly and constantly, their reliance interests
would be destroyed. Third, public decisionmakers often rely on those
rules when establishing or changing other rules. Changing one rule
might then unhinge other rules built upon it.
Given these policies, the presumption of correctness should apply
to interpretations that subserve the policies of continuity. Hence, the
strongest case for application of the presumption is for a "building
218. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting

Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 489); see Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1844 (1988)
("We are unwilling in the face of such congressional inaction to alter the long-standing apportionment between carrier and worker of the costs of railroading injuries. If prejudgment interest
is to be available under the FELA, then Congress must expressly so provide."); Guardians Assn.
v. Civil Serv. Commn., 463 U.S. 582, 621 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part) ("(I]t is appropriate to attribute significance to [legislative] inaction where an administrative interpretation 'involves [salient] issues' . . . and Congress has not acted to correct any misinterpretation of its
objectives despite its continuing concern with the subject matter .•.• "); North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (similar); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686
(1981) ("Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but 'long-continued practice, known to
and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in
pursuance of its consent.' ") (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1915)).
219. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 248 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195,
210 (1962) (When repeal of a specific statutory section is urged upon Congress and rejected in
conference committee, "the normal expectation is that courts will be faithful to their trust and
abide by that decision.'').
220. The legislative inaction cases are very much connected with stare decisis, because many
of them deal with the Supreme Court's statutory interpretations. But the cases also deal with
Congress' response to settled statutory interpretations by the executive, agencies, and lower
courts.
221. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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block interpretation." Following the policy reasons for continuity in
law, a building block interpretation has the following characteristics.
First, it must be an authoritative or settled interpretation, setting a
firm direction for the statute's development. Hence, a lower court interpretation not followed by other courts, or an informal agency practice would not be a building block interpretation. Second, it must be
one on which parties subject to the statute have (probably) relied in
structuring their conduct. A widely ignored interpretation is not a
building block one. Third, it must be one upon which public decisionmakers have (apparently) relied in devel~ping further legal rules.
Conversely, the presumption of correctness does not inhere in a
judicial, executive, or agency interpretation which is "unsettled,"
namely, one that is not authoritative_ and has not been the basis of
private or public reliance. (Now, such an interpretation may in fact be
correct, but it is entitled to no presumption.) Obviously, most interpretations are intermediate cases, neither building blocks nor unsettled. For example, a lower court interpretation upon which private .
parties but not public decisionmakers have relied is not quite a building block interpretation, but it is. entitled to some presumption of
correctness.
My reading of the cases is largely descriptive. I think it adequately
accounts for the Court's concerns in the legislative inaction cases and
for most of the apparently anomalous results reached by the Court.
For example, contrast the Court's application of the acquiescence rule
in Monell with that in Johnson. 222 In Monell, the Court overruled a
seventeen-year-old precedent (Monroe), notwithstanding congressional
inaction, while in Johnson the Court reaffirmed an eight-year-old precedent (Weber), based upon congressional acquiescence. My explanation for the different results is that the Court considered Monroe an
unsettled precedent, and Weber a building block one: Monell gave
four reasons why it would be unjustified to " 'place on the shoulders of
Congress the burden of [correcting] the Court's own error.' " 223 The
first three reasons parallel the three continuity values underlying the
presumption of correctness: Monroe was inconsistent with the Court's
practice both before and after 1961, Congress had not relied on
Monroe and in fact had assumed in the 1976 Fees Act that Monroe did
not really protect local governments from suit, and there was no justi222. Dissenting in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1473, Justice Scalia argued that if Congress' failure
to overturn Weber could be taken by the Court as evidence that the decision is correct, the same
argument ought to have persuaded the Court that Monroe is correct.
223. 436 U.S. at 695-701 (quoting Girouard, 328 U.S. at 70); see 436 U.S. at 708-13 (Powell,
J., concurring).
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fiable private reliance. 224 I read these to say that there were no continuity-of-law justifications for affording Monroe a presumption of
correctness. The fourth reason given in Monell was "'that it appear[ed] beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871 statute
that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning' " of the statute. 225 That
is, even if the presumption of correctness had applied, the Court might
still have· overruled Monroe because its error was so clear. Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson sought to characterize Weber as
similarly aberrational, 226 but his arguments were forcefully rebutted
by Justice Stevens' concurring opinion.227 Justice Stevens argued that
Weber is now an important part of the fabric of the law, relied upon by
unions and employers seeking to bring their workforces into compliance with Title VII; the Court has been building upon Weber in a
series of cases that have spelled out in more detail the contours of that
decision. Though Weber is a recent decision and is not without analytical problems, those problems come nowhere near to challenging the
presumed correctness of such a building block case. 228
For a more difficult pair of cases, consider Sinclair and Boys Markets. Sinclair's reliance on the Taft-Hartley conference committee's
rejection of the House proposal to curtail the Norris-LaGuardia Act
seems like a decisive argument, because the Congress enacting the statute being interpreted squarely considered the issue and reached formal
agreement. Nonetheless, Boys Markets not only denied that argument, but also rejected an argument based upon post-1962 legislative
acquiescence in Sinclair. 229 Under the Court's actual intent approach,
these cases seem entirely anomalous: Surely Sinclair, and not Boys
Markets, accurately discerned the actual legislative intent. But my
presumed intent approach suggests a plausible way to reconcile the
two cases, as the Court itself recognized. "It is precisely because Sinclair [in 1970] stands as a significant departure from our otherwise
consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote the
224. 436 U.S. at 695-700; see Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 9, at
1382-83, 1393-96.
225. 436 U.S. at 700 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring)); see 436 U.S.
at 664-89 (elaborate analysis of original legislative intent).
226. 107 S. Ct. at 1471-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. 107 S. Ct. at 1457-60 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Prece·
dents, supra note 9, at 1411-14. The Court's only response to Justice Scalia was invocation of the
acquiescence rule, 107 S. Ct. at 1450 n.7, but presumably the Court generally agreed with Justice
Stevens' favorable characterization of Weber.
228. For an extended analysis of why I think Weber is a building block case and (indeed)
why I think Weber was correctly decided, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra
note 161, at 1492-94.
229. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 240-42.
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peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration ... that we
believe Sinclair should be reconsidered." 230 In 1962, Sinclair was a
persuasive decision because the action of the conference committee
was consistent with fundamental labor policies, and the rejected proposal was inconsistent with them. The committee's action created a
presumption of legislative intent because it sustained the longstanding
anti-injunction policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act against incursion
by the newer policy of encouraging labor arbitration. That latter policy was in large part judicially created in a series of decisions handed
down only a few years before Sinclair. 231 But by 1970, when Boys
Markets was decided, the policy subordinated in Sinclair had become
fundamental (enforceable labor arbitration became the linchpin of national labor policy), and Sinclair's preferred policy had become less
urgent. Additionally, it had become clear by 1970 that Sinclair was
interfering with state court injunctions compelling arbitration, which
went beyond the concerns of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 232
Finally, return to Flood, which is very hard to defend under an
actual intent approach. Under the presumed intent approach, it remains marginal but is at least defensible. Was Federal Baseball/Toolson a building block interpretation triggering a congressional burden
of response if it disagreed? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the
interpretation had been in place for half a century and had created
substantial private reliance interests. No, in the sense that the interpretation was increasingly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's overall antitrust jurisprudence, and even inconsistent with the Court's
application of antitrust law to professional athletics. The dissenting
Justices stressed the inconsistency with general antitrust law, while the
majority stressed the longstanding interpretation and current reliance.
Under the descriptive approach outlined here, Federal Baseball/Toolson was entitled to a weak presumption of correctness, which was apparently enough to save these decisions given the close case on the
merits. 233
230. 398 U.S. at 241.
231. See Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
232. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 242-49; Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra
note 9, at 1390-91.
233. In the eyes of the Justices, anyway. Professor Stephen Ross has suggested to me that
there were in 1972 several very good current-policy arguments in favor of preserving baseball's
antitrust exemption. Hence, Justice Blackmun (the author of Flood and apparently a great baseball fan) and perhaps the other Justices were persuaded by the arguments, which I hope Professor Ross publishes. (The vote in Flood was five to three.)

114

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:67

B. Problems with the Legislative Inaction Cases, Even Under the
Presumed Intent Theory

My explanation of the Court's legislative inaction cases, focusing
on the presumption of correctness for building block interpretations
that Congress does not overrule, is only descriptive. The question remains: If this really does capture what the Court is doing, is it normatively defensible? The main problem I have with the presumed intent
approach is that it, like the actual intent approach, exacerbates dysfunctions in the legislative process. As I argued in Part II, 234 the legislative process is heavily inertial, and many interests are not effectively
heard. I am concerned that the presumption of correctness might
overprotect interpretations benefitting well-organized interests, too
often at the expense of the general welfare. That is, once an organized
interest wrests a favorable interpretation from the courts or a captured
agency and of course relies on it, it will very probably be able to rely
on the presumption of correctness, because its interpretation is a building block one and Congress is unlikely to express disapproval, given
the interest group's ability to mobilize opposition to any effort to
change the interpretation legislatively. Conversely, if a judicial or administrative interpretation hurts the interests of the same well-organized group, the group will often have a fighting chance to obtain a
legislative overrufuig.
In short, the legislative inaction cases - however they are explained - have an asymmetrical, and unfair, impact on the development of legal rules. For this reason, I should urge that the
presumption of correctness should be a weak one if the Court perceives that interests hurt by the building block interpretation do not
have effective access to the political process. For me, this concern vitiates the use of legislative inaction in Flood, and I disagree with its
result.
A second, and related, problem I have with the Court's practice in
the legislative inaction cases is that it may foster or preserve obsolescent statutory interpretations, because the practice on the whole
overvalues reliance interests and the historical continuity of one line of
interpretation, to the detriment of the present coherence and fairness
of our law. Again, Flood is an example of this phenomenon. Another
is Monessen Southwestern Railway v. Morgan, 235 decided at the close
of the 1987 Term. Monessen interpreted the Federal Employers' Lia234. See text at notes 201-13 supra.
235. 108 S. Ct. 1837 (1988).
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bility Act (FELA)236 not to allow plaintiffs prejudgment interest as
part of their damages awards. The Court argued that when FELA
was enacted in 1908 the common law did not permit prejudgment interest in suits for personal injury or wrongful death and that the statute's failure to provide for such interest suggested an original intent
not to include it.237 Additionally, the Court relied on Congress' failure to overturn the virtually uniform line of federal and state decisions
holding that FELA does not permit prejudgment,interest and on Congress' rejection of a proposal to amend the general federal interest statute to include prejudgment interest across the board. The Court
suggested that this somehow tells us something about legislative intent,238 but the basic message of the opinion was that the Court was
"unwilling in the face of such congressional inaction to alter the longstanding apportionment between carrier and worker of the costs of ...
injuries. If prejudgment interest is to be available under the FELA,
then Congress must expressly so provide."239
A dissenting opinion in Monessen argued that FELA's compensatory purposes are ill-served by denying claimants prejudgment interest
on out-of-pocket losses, for that denies the claimant the make-whole
remedy intended by Congress. 240 As to the Court's legislative silence
arguments, the dissenting Justices argued that even in 1908 the common law rule was being criticized as inconsistent with the compensatory purposes of tort law, and today's common law endorses
prejudgment interest on out-of-pocket losses.241 Also, they argued
that the "consistent judicial interpretation" of FELA was unpersuasive, because most of the decisions engaged in no meaningful analysis
of the subject, and several recent ones that did analyze it recognized
the "excellent case" to be made for prejudgment interest. 242 " 'We do
not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every time a lower.
court indulges in an erroneous interpretation,' " sniffed the
dissenters. 243
Monessen is arguably consistent with the Court's-legislative inac236. 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
237. 108 S. Ct. at 1843. Especially since Congress in FELA abrogated several other common
law doctrines of the era.
238. "Congress' failure to disturb a consistent jµdicial interpretation of a statute may provide
some indication 'that Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that [interpretation].'" 108 S. Ct. at 1843-44 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703
(1979)).
239. 108 S. Ct. at 1844.
240. 108 S. Ct. at 1847-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. 108 S. Ct. at 1848-49.
242. 108 S. Ct. at 1848 n.3.
243. 108 S. Ct. n.3 (quoting Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 533-34 (1947)).
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tion cases because the interpretation denying prejudgment interest was
so longstanding and relatively unbroken as to justify at least a weak
presumption of correctness.244 But even if this is the case, Monessen
illustrates a tendency of the legislative inaction cases to perpetuate legally obsolescent rules. That, in tum, owes much to the ambiguity of
the underlying policy - continuity in law. There are two kinds of
continuity in law, vertical and horizontal. The Monessen majority emphasized "vertical continuity," that is, the consistency of interpretation over time, for just the one issue. The dissent emphasized
"horizontal discontinuity," that is, the inconsistency of denying FELA
claimants prejudgment interest with the evolving purposes of FELA,
the modem consensus that prejudgment interest is often necessary to
assure compensatory relief, and the Court's willingness in other statutes to infer prejudgment interest. I believe that both types of continuity are important. Vertical continuity is often necessary to protect
reliance interests and predictability of legal rules, but horizontal continuity is often necessary to effectuate dynamic statutory goals and assure overall fairness. When there is a clash between the values of
vertical and horizontal continuity, I should often favor horizontal continuity. Hence, I believe the Monessen dissent had the better
arguments.
My third concern with the presumptive intent approach to the legislative inaction cases is that it may sometimes slight actual legislative
intent. In Pierce v. Underwood, 245 also decided at the end of the 1987
Term, the Court interpreted the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980
(EAJA),246 which provides that in civil litigation brought by or against
the United States, federal courts shall award the prevailing party (but
not the United States) its attorney's fees and other expenses, "unless
the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. " 247
Based upon language in the House and Senate committee reports, and
244. The lower court interpretation in which Congress "acquiesced" was 1101 a classic building block interpretation, because it was not entirely authoritative (i.e., there was no Supreme
Court holding) and did not clearly create private reliance interests (though there may have been
insurance assumptions). Cf. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) (no acquiescence in longstanding lower court practice in FELA cases). On the other hand, the interpretation was not unsettled, either. The lower court cases were all but unanimous, and there may
have been congressional reliance on them when the general prejudgment interest proposal was
rejected. At most, the lower court interpretation was entitled to a weak presumption of correctness - a presumption that, I should have thought, is rebutted by its inconsistency with the
statutory policy of make-whole relief.
245. 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
246. Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified as amended and reenacted at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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in the 1980 conference report, most of the federal circuits interpreted
the statute to impose fees on the United States only when its position
was not justified in the substance or in the main, that is, to a degree
that would satisfy a reasonable person.248 In 1984, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the prevailing test and held that the United
States had to show something more than mere reasonableness to forestall the imposition of fees. 249 In 1985 Congress reenacted the statute,
using precisely the same language. The House report for the 1985 reenactment, however, opined that " 'substantial justification' means
more than merely reasonable" and that the lower court decisions accepting a reasonableness standard were wrong. 250 Although Underwood cited no other evidence of legislative intent in the 1985
reenactment of the statute, it found this relatively clear committee language insufficient to rebut the presumption that the general trend in
lower court interpretations was the one intended by Congress. 25 1
An initial problem with decisions like the one in Underwood relates
to overall interpretive methodology. Traditionally, actual legislative
intent has been considered the lodestar of statutory interpretation,252
and a number of recent scholars hav:e argued that original legislative
intent is usually the only relevant criterion for interpreting a statute. 253
The concept of presumed intent, based upon the policy concerns underlying the legislative duty to respond, might be inconsistent with
this traditional understanding. I do not find this very problematic,
though, because the traditional focus is an oversimplification of what
statutory interpretation involves. 254 For example, judicially created
policy presumptions, often called clear statement rules, are not new to
statutory interpretation.255 There are literally dozens of them, including the rule of lenity, that penal statutes should be interpreted nar248. See Undenvood, 108 S. Ct. at 2550 (citing cases).
249. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936
(1984).
250. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985).
251. 108 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
252. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 10, § 45.05.
253. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985);
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
254. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 161; Patterson, Interpretation in Law - Toward a Reconstruction of the Cu"ent Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984).
Indeed, Judge Posner, who generally seeks original or reconstructed legislative understandings
when interpreting statutes, supra note 253, has recognized an increasing number of exceptions to
that rule. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 761, 774-77 (1987); Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179 (1986).
255. See W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 162, at 655-96; Eskridge, Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation (May 1988 draft) (forthcoming).
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rowly in favor of the defendant when they are ambiguous; 256 the
presumption against congressional diminishment of the historic police
powers of the states;257 and the presumption against waiver of sovereign immunity; 258 to list just a few. Like the presumption of correctness when Congress fails to disapprove of a building block
interpretation, these well-established rules presume a congressional intent, based upon important national policies (fair notice to criminal
defendants, federalism, sovereign immunity). " 'The normal rule. of
statutory construction,' " the Court emphasized just last Term, " 'is
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.' "259
An even closer doctrinal relative to the presumption analyzed here
is the special stare decisis rule for statutory precedents. The Court is
often more reluctant to overrule a statutory precedent than a constitutional or common law precedent.260 The Court gives various reasons
for what I call the "super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents~" The most popular one is that when the Court misinterprets .a statute, Congress is the better forum for correcting the error.
This is simply another way of saying: Once the Court interprets a
statute, Congress has the burden of response if it disagrees; if it does
not respond, the Court can presume (as it did in Flood, Runyon, and
Johnson) that its interpretation was correct.261 While I think that the
256. "[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what Congress has made a
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should
have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1964), quoted in United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293,
297 (1971); see McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987) (if Congress wishes mail
fraud statute to have broad reach, "it must speak more clearly than it has").
257. The Court~ "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); see Rose v. Rose, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 2041 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 358-60 (1986).
258. Because " '[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to
be sued,' " a waiver of federal government immunity in a statute must be " 'unequivocally expressed.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see Library of Congress v. Shaw,
106 S. Ct. 2957, 2961 (1986). Similarly, as to immunity for states, "Congress must express its
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.''
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
259. Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 359 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Midlantic
Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)).
260. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 540 (1948); see
Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 9, at 1363 & n.12 (citing authorities), 136469 (tracing history and rationales).
261. I demonstrated in Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 9, that the Court departs
from this super-strong presumption quite often. My argument was that the Court should adopt
an evolutive approach to overruling statutory precedents, parallel to the building block policy
theory advanced in this article.
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Court's reluctance to overrule statutory precedents is too strong Gust
as I believe the Court relies too often on legislative inaction), neither I,
nor other critics, would fault it for violating our constitutional separation of powers.
Thus, I am not much troubled by the Court's willingness to presume legislative intent. What does trouble me is the cavalier way the
Court treated the evidence of actual intent in Underwood and its reluctaµce to consider evidence rebutting the reenactment presumption'.
The Court belittled rather than analyzed the position taken by the
1985 House committee report that the statute had been misinterpreted
by the lower court opinions. Committee reports are generally considered authoritative, 262 and I do not see why the House report should
not have been entitled to at least some consideration by the Court. 263
Indeed, there is evidence that some members of the 1980 Congress
intended that the standard fall somewhere between reasonableness and
automatic fee awards. The original Senate bill in 1979 would have
awarded fees automatically; the Department of Justice sought an
amendment to impose fees only when the Government action was "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless"; the Senate Judiciary
Committee adopted a compromise position in the "substantially justified" test, rejecting both the Government's test and a test of "reasonable justification."264 To be sure, the committee reports for the 1980
statute support Underwood's interpretation, but my point is that the
Court blatantly ignored actual legislative expectations. There are arguments to be made on both sides about the intent of Congress in
262. Note that Justice Scalia authored the Underwood decision. Justice Scalia has openly
expressed his disdain for reliance on committee reports to interpret statutes. See Hirschey v.
FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same EAJA issue as in Underwood). Though some lower court judges find his position tenable, there is no indication that his
view is widely shared on the Supreme Court. Cf. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988) (criticizing Justice Scalia's position).
263. See Underwood, 108 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The
Government argued that sponsors of the EAJA "renounced" portions of the House report on the
floor of the House and Senate. Petitioner's Brief at 17-18, Underwood (No. 86-1512). This was a
pretty outrageous argument, because the portion questioned did not relate to the test being considered in Underwood. As one of the questioners said, "[t]he committee report ... should not be
interpreted to suggest that a finding of an agency action that was not supported by substantial
evidence would automatically entitle a prevailing party to fees." According to the questioner,
this was "the only error I found in the report." 131 CoNG. REc. H4763 (daily ed. June 24,
1985); see Respondents' Brief at 26-27, Underwood (No. 86-1512).
264. S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1979); see Underwood, 108 S. Ct. at 2556
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). In the House hearings on the Senate bill, Senator
DeConcini (one of the sponsors) agreed with the statement that " 'substantially' justified would
be more difficult for the agency or department to meet, than 'reasonable.' " Award of Attorney's
Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 38 (1980): But see 125 CoNG. REc. 21435 (1979) (earlier statement of Sen. DeConcini
articulating test in terms of reasonableness).
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1985, or even 1980. My problem with Underwood, and some of the
other legislative inaction cases,265 is that the Court short-circuited
those arguments by its reliance on the presumption.
C.

The Presumption of Correctness (Reformulated) and Patterson

Given my normative problems with the legislative inaction cases, I
should urge the following refined approach: The presumption of correctness should apply for a building block intetj>tetatiori;' 'so long as
those hurt by the interpretation have had some meaningful access to
the legislative process. A building block interpretation must be one
which is not only authoritative and vertically coherent (reliance), but
also horizontally coherent (consistent with current policies). The presumption of correctness can be rebutted by persuasive evidence that
Congress in fact has disapproved of the building block interpretation.
Consider the issues in Patterson under this approach. Is Runyon a
building block interpretation? If so, is the presumption of correctness
rebutted by contrary evidence of actual legislative intent?
Whether or not Runyon was originally a correct interpretation of
section 1981, it has become a building block one, given the descriptive
and normative considerations set out above. First, and most important, its interpretation is both vertically and horizontally coherent.
Runyon flowed naturally from the Court's interpretation of section
1982 in Alfred H. Mayer (which was the real turning point) and the
experience in the lower courts, and the Court has followed or assumed
that interpretation several times in the last decade. Hundreds of private lawsuits have been brought under section 1981, and the Department of Justice in Runyon had argued that it favored the
interpretation as a way of complementing the Government's enforcement of the desegregation mandate in education. 266 The interpretation
is also consistent with our overall legal and constitutional evolution in
the last twenty years. Not only has the legal system remained committed to the antidiscrimination principle in education and employment,
but the system has expanded upon it administratively (by denying tax
benefits to schools that discriminate), legislatively (the Fees Act in
1976, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, the Restoration Act
in 1988), and judicially (Bob Jones). That commitment has also been a
commitment to providing a "multiplicity" of remedies for victims of
discrimination. In short, Runyon's result is consistent at many levels
265. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 83·84 (1933)
(refusing to rebut presumption of acquiescence in administrative interpretations, despite contrary
statements in both House and Senate committee reports).
266. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Runyon (No. 75·62).
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with previous and subsequent legal developments and "surely accords
with the prevailing sense of justice today." 2 67
Second, there has been substantial public reliance on Runyon's interpretation. At the federal level, the best example is the Fees Act. In
that statute, Congress assumed that section 1981 provided for private
actions and sought to encourage such actions with counsel fee incentives. At a more general level, Congress has been encouraging expansive civil rights enforcement quite strongly. Indeed, 66 Senators and
118 Members of the House have filed a brief in Patterson asserting
their continuing support for, and reliance on, the Runyon interpretation.268 The brief makes it clear that many legislators would consider
overruling Runyon not only erroneous, but an interference in Congress' agenda, darkly hinting that the Restoration Act of 1988 ought
to warn the Court not to interpret civil rights statutes narrowly. "To
require the Congress to revisit this issue could jeopardize the closure
and repose that we have obtained as a Nation on the issue of racial
discrimination." 269 At the state level, there is a similar consensus.
Forty-seven states have joined in a brief arguing that state remedies for
private discrimination would be left inadequate if Runyon were
overruled.270
Third, but least important, there may have been some private reliance on Runyon. The petitioner in Patterson asserts that she waived
her Title VII claims because she did not go through its procedural
labyrinth, thinking that she could bring the same claims under section
1981;271 and there may be some other claimants in her position who
would lose legal rights through no fault of their own if Runyon were
overruled with retroactive effect. Other reliance arguments may exist
in this case,272 but in my view they are hard to quantify, and the public
reliance arguments are far more persuasive.
If Runyon is a building block case, as I think it is, the burden was
on Congress to overturn it if it disagreed with its result. Obviously,
Congress has not overturned Runyon, and the presumption of its correctness applies in full force. If anything, the presumption is strengthened by Congress' reliance on the interpretation when it enacted the
267. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring).
268. Congress' Brief, supra note 8, at 20-28.
269. Id. at 6.
270. Brief of Forty-Seven States, the District of Columbia, and Three Territories as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-3, Patterson (No. 87-107).
271. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 105.
272. E.g., Congress' Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 18 (parents have relied on the decision by
putting their children in private schools with the assurance that -they would remain
desegregated).
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Fees Act in 1976. ·The presumed correctness of Runyon ought to preserve the precedent unless it was a clearly incorrect interpretation. I
have undertaken no independent research on this issue but am impressed by arguments that Runyon was not clearly erroneous. 273
In short, if the Court wants to make sense of, and be faithful to, its
legislative inaction precedents, Patterson is a classic case for their invocation. Indeed, I consider Patterson to be a more appealing case for
the invocation of legislative inaction arguments than either Monessen
or Underwood. Unlike Monessen, Patterson involves not only a longstanding and well-settled statutory interpretation, but one that is consistent with our society's evolving law. Unlike Underwood, Patterson
involves a statutory interpretation that not only appears to enjoy continued support in Congress, but is one upon which Congress relied
when it passed the Fees Act in 1976. Given the Court's own vow to
"treat all litigants equally" when it asked for new briefs in Patterson, 274 it should reaffirm Runyon's building block interpretation.
CONCLUSION

It is noteworthy that a central theme running through all three of
the articles in this Symposium on Patterson is the dynamic nature of
statutory interpretation.275 I have defended this general proposition in
earlier articles, 276 and this article explores its relationship to legislative
inaction arguments. From my perspective, the main legisprudential ·
issue raised by these legislative inaction cases is how much we want to
emphasize vertical continuity in legal rules, at the expense of flexibility
in our system of evolving law. While the Anglo-American legal tradition is one that has placed a great value on vertical continuity in the
law, that emphasis is somewhat less tenable today, when most of our
law is agency-made rather than judge-made, and when society and its
problems change at an ever-increasing pace. The primary threat to
law's integrity in modern times is obsolescence rather than unpredict273. See Farber, supra note 68, at 18; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 5-71; see also
Aleinikoff, supra note 161, at 95.
274. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421. The four Justices dissenting from the request had charged
that the Court ought not disturb a precedent protecting civil rights. 108 S. Ct. at 1422-23 (Ste·
vens, J., dissenting).
275. Aleinikoff, supra note 161, uses Patterson as a way to contrast history-focused "archeological" µiodes of statutory interpretation with a current-policy focused "nautical" mode, which
the author endorses. Farber, supra note 68, uses the ambiguous evidence of historical intent in
Patterson to show how even conventional statutory interpretation necessarily considers current
policies.
276. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 161, articulates and defines the
general proposition, and Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 206, presents economic
arguments for the proposition. This article and Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra
note 9, apply dynamic interpretation insights to important doctrinal issues.
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ability and instability. 277 In my opinion, our aspiration for coherence
in the law should concentrate more on the horizontal coherence of
current policies, and less on the vertical coherence of a single policy
backwards in time. Congress itself is the most legitimate institution
for achieving greater horizontal coherence. But given the structural
inertia and biases of the legislature, it is those who interpret and implement statutes - agencies, the executive, courts - that have the primary burden of fostering horizontal coherence.
Read broadly, the legislative inaction cases threaten to exacerbate
the problems of inertia and bias - and obsolescence - in our system
of government. The rhetoric used by the Supreme Court in these cases
can be read to ossify statutory interpretations that have no other virtue
save longevity. But the cases need not be read so broadly. A more
sensible reading of the cases suggests that some statutory interpretations are building blocks, upon which future law can be constructed,
while other interpretations may be aberrations overtaken by subsequent developments in law and society. As a descriptive theory, the
theory of presumed correctness explains the cases and ameliorates the
problem of obsolescence.
But the theory of presumed correctness for building block interpretations is not satisfying as a normative theory, and I believe several of
the Court's legislative inaction cases are wrong. If a narrow, wellorganized group wins a favorable interpretation - perhaps by fortuity, perhaps by sheer perseverance - from the courts, an agency, or
the executive, and then builds its own reliance interests and trumpets
it to Congress, should the courts or agency not be able to change its
mind later, when problems with the interpretation become manifest? I
don't see why not, and hence I believe Flood v. Kuhn was wrongly
decided. If an early interpretation becomes boilerplate law, cited with
approval by courts and even committee reports because of its age and
not because of its persuasiveness, should that interpretation not be
subject to reevaluation if it becomes seriously inconsistent with current
values? I don't see why not, and hence I believe Monessen was
wrongly decided.
As a normative proposition, the legislative inaction precedents I
should not have joined - Catholic Bishop of Chicago and Snyder, as
well as Flood and Monessen - are those where the Court has invoked
the presumption of correctness for interpretations having strong
claims of vertical .continuity and (sometimes) private reliance, and
weak claims of horizontal continuity and current fairness. For such
277. See generally G. CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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interpretations, I u~ge a relaxation of the presumption of correctness.
Private reliance interests can be protected in such cases by changing
the interpretation prospectively, perhaps with a time period for private
persons to adapt to the new rule. As for the virtues of vertical continuity, an interpretation that persists over time, yet becomes increasingly inconsistent with the surrounding legal terrain, does not have the
unambiguous blessing of tradition and often ought to yield to current
values and policies. · ·
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APPENDIX 1: ACQUIESCENCE CASES (1961-1988)
This appendix collects the main Supreme Court cases decided between 1961and1988 in which the Court considered the argument that
Congress acquiesced in a judicial, executive, or agency interpretation.
Cases are included only if the Court's opinion, or a concurring or dissenting opinion, emphasized the argument. There is no claim that this
is a complete listing, therefore. Where this appendix cites to a dissenting or special concurring opinion, the citation is to arguments not accepted by the Court.

A. Judicial Interpretationst

Finding Acquiescence
Monessen Southwestern Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S. Q:. 1837, 1843-44
(1988) (lower court interpretation).
United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 & n.6 (1987).
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Ci;ilifornia, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1450 & n.7 (1987).
Square D Co. v. Niagara, Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 420
(1986).
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Association, 473 U.S. 61,
84 (1985).
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 55 n.18 (1985).
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983)
(lower court interpretation).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 381-82 (1982) (lower court interpretation).
Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 445 U.S. 74, 85 (1980)
(lower court interpretation). See also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (lower
court interpretation).
·
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33
(1975) (lower court interpretation).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200-01 (1974)
(lower court interpretation).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 280-85 (1972).
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 8-02 (1972).

t Acquiescence arguments based upon lower federal court interpretations arc noted by a
pa,renthetical to that effect. Otherwise, the arguments are ~ased qpol), ~'Ql'fen;le Court.opinions.
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Canada Packers~- Ltd. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 385
U.S. 182, 184 (1966).
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1964).
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1962) (lower court
interpretation).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 186-87 (1961).

Finding No Acquiescence
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 S. Ct. 971, 977 n.7
(1988) (lower court interpretation).
Commissioner v. Fink, 107 S. Ct. 2729, 2736-38 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (lower court interpretation); see McNally v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Citicorp
Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694, 2703-04 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332,
2342-43 (1987).
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 2154 (1987)
(lower court interpretation).
Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 125-28 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lower court interpretation).
Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 614-16 (1981)
(one lower court interpretation).
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 693-94 & n.11 (1980) (lower court
and SEC interpretation).
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 390-94 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (lower court interpretation).
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 223-24 & n.8 (1976).
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 327 n.17 (1971).
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 120 (1970) (lower court
interpretation).
United States v. Weldon, 377 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1964) (lower court
interpretation).
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1961) (plurality
opinion).
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B. Executive and Agency Interpretations
Finding Acquiescence
School Board v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1 i26-27 (1987).
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority,
107 s. Ct. 766, 774 (1987).
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137
(1985).
SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745-47 (1984).
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 568 & n.19 (1984).
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582,
593 & n:14 (1983) (White, J.); see 463 U.S. at 616-24 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-602
(1983).
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535
(1982).
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.,
454 U.S. 170, 187-90 (1981).
United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 564 (1982).
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-01 (1981).
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 383-85 (1981).
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-82 (1981).
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 519-21 (1981).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associ~ted Dry
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981).
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 673 & n.12 (1980).
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 & n.10 (1979).
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 245-48, 251-52 (1978).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33
(1975).
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975).
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 73-74 (1974).
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1974).
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1969).
FTC v. Flotilla Products, Inc., 389 U.S. 179, 189-90 (1967).
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. l, 11-12 (1965).
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Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 388-95 (1963).
Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 483 (1963).
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 257-59 (1963).
Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electric, Radio & Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1961).
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States,
366 U.S. 169, 179 (1961).

Finding No Acquiescence
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 45-46 (1983).
Rowan Companies v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 258-62 (1981).
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980).
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406-12
(1979).
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978).
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1975).
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212-30 (1974).
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-93 (1969).
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 120 (1970).
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Local 1212, 364
U.S. 573 (1961).
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CASES (1961-1988)

This appendix collects Supreme Court cases decided between 1961
and 1988 in which the Court considered the argument that Congress
had ratified a judicial or administrative interpretation when it reenacted the statute without change. Cases are included only if the
Court's opinion, or a concurring or dissenting opinion, emphasizes the
argument. There is no claim that this is a complete listing, therefore.
Where this appendix cites to a dissenting or specially concurring opinion, the citation is to arguments not accepted by the Court.
A. Judicial Interpretationst
Ratification by Reenactment

Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51 (1988) (lower court
interpretation).
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (lower court interpretation). See also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782-85
& n.15 (1985) (lower court interpretation).
Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 225 (1984) (lower court
interpretation).
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 401-02
(1983) (lower court interpretatiOn).
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983)
(lower court interpretation).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 381-82 (1982) (lower court interpretation).
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 18-19 & n.11 (1980) (lower
court interpretation).
Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 445 U.S. 74, 85 (1980)
(lower court interpretation).
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74
& n.16 (1978).
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (statement of rule).
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 279 (1977).
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976)
(lower court interpretation).
t Reenactment arguments based upon lower federal court interpretations will be denoted as
such. Otherwise, assume that the reenactment argument is based upon a Supreme Court
decision.
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United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422
U.S. 271, 279-81 (1975).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975)
(lower court interpretation).
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973).
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 &
n.10 (1972) (lower court interpretation).
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969).
No Ratification by Reenactment

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 n.8
(1988).
Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 125-28 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lower court interpretation).
South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 392 n.9 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 346-48 (1984) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (lower court interpretation).
Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 614-15 (1981)
(single lower court decision).
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 829-32 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (lower court interpretation).
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980).
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 391-93 & n.24 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lower court
interpretation).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 33536 n.7 (1971) (lower court interpretation).
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55 n.13 (1964) (lower court
interpretation).
Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1962) (lower court interpretation).
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1961) (plurality
opinion).
B. Executive and Agency Interpretations

Ratification by Reenactment

City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 794, 798 n.9
(1987).
Clarke v. Securities Industries Association, 479 U.S. 388 {1987).
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986).
Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 428, 437 (1986).
United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1982).
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297-98, 300-01 (1981).
Board of Education of City School District of New York v. Harris,
444 U.S. 130, 148-49 (1979).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457 (1978).
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,
435 U.S. 110, 133-34 (1978).
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 480 (1978) (statement of rule).
Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569, 575-77
(1977).
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548, 567-71 (1976).
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975).
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 283
(1966).
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1965).
Commissioner v. Noel's Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965).
No Ratification by Reenactment
· Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (1987) (plurality opinion).
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980).
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1978).
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 24-25 (1969).
Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 292-95 (1967).
FPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U.S. 90, 110-11 n.30 (1965).
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APPENDIX 3: REJECTED PROPOSAL CASES (1961-1988)
This appendix collects Supreme Court cases decided between 1961
and 1988 in which the Court considered the argument that it should
not interpret a statute to embrace a meaning rejected by Congress
(usually through a conference committee), or by one House of Congress (voting down a proposed amendment or bill), or by a committee
of Congress (usually by failing to report a proposed bill). Cases are
included only if the Court's opinion, or a concurring or dissenting
opinion, emphasizes the argument. There is no claim that this is a
comprehensive listing, therefore. Where this appendix cites to a dissenting or specially concurring opinion, the citation is to arguments
not accepted by the Court.

A.,·

Failure of Bicameral Agreement or Presentment
Inferring Significance

Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2748-50 (1987).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (1987).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
137-38 (1985).
Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656, 665
n.3 (1985).
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mission Indians,
466 U.S. 765, 787 (1984).
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1983).
Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1983).
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 264 n.8 (1981).
Board of Education of City School District of New York v. Harris,
444 U.S. 130, 148-49 (1979).
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 544 n.44 (1979).
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
346-47 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974).
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 707-10 (1973), overruled, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972).
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 598 (1969).
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Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69
(1965).
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-10 (1962),
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(1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1975).
Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301,
312 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 535-36 (1972).
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Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582,
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Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 358-59
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Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 276 n.14 (1980).
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James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1961) (plurality
opinion).

C. Failure of Proposal To Escape Committee

Inferring Significance
Monessen Southwestern Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1844 n.8
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(1988).
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